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“...at the most basic level individual human beings killed other  
human beings in large numbers over an extended period of time.”  
– Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, xv. 
  
s1342487 
4 
 
Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 6 
Definitions ................................................................................................................................. 7 
Literature review ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Method .................................................................................................................................... 14 
Concepts .................................................................................................................................. 18 
Hypotheses .............................................................................................................................. 26 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 29 
Discussion................................................................................................................................ 36 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 44 
References ............................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix A – Codebook ........................................................................................................ 51 
Appendix B – Individual geno-politicide coding ................................................................. 58 
Sudan 1956-1972.................................................................................................................. 58 
China 1959 ........................................................................................................................... 62 
South Vietnam ...................................................................................................................... 66 
Indonesia 1965-66 ................................................................................................................ 69 
China 1966-75 ...................................................................................................................... 73 
Pakistan ................................................................................................................................ 77 
Uganda 1971-1979 ............................................................................................................... 81 
Philippines ............................................................................................................................ 84 
Burundi 1972-73 .................................................................................................................. 88 
Angola .................................................................................................................................. 92 
Cambodia ............................................................................................................................. 96 
Indonesia 1975-92 .............................................................................................................. 100 
Guatemala........................................................................................................................... 104 
Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 108 
s1342487 
5 
 
El Salvador ......................................................................................................................... 111 
Uganda 1980-86 ................................................................................................................. 115 
Sudan 1983-2002................................................................................................................ 119 
Iraq ..................................................................................................................................... 123 
Bosnia ................................................................................................................................. 127 
Burundi 1993 ...................................................................................................................... 132 
Rwanda ............................................................................................................................... 135 
Appendix C – Coding references ........................................................................................ 139 
 
 
  
s1342487 
6 
 
Introduction 
Among mass killings in the 20th century, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide is often seen as 
unique, “an example of how virtually an entire society can turn to murder” (Valentino 2005, 
37). While the killing was planned by Hutu elites, thousands of ordinary civilians joined in 
the killing alongside the army and militias (Straus 2006, 117-118). Even those most sceptical 
of mass involvement in the killing allow for a high number of participants of around two 
hundred thousand (Valentino 2005, 37). While Valentino minimizes this by suggesting that it 
is “less than 9 percent of the male Hutu population” (37), as Straus points out it is rare for any 
government to be able to mobilize such a proportion of the population for a state project, let 
alone one involving murder (2006, 118). Rwanda seems indeed to be an example of how 
civilians can become a vital part of mass killing. Yet while we have a wealth of knowledge 
on popular participation in the Rwandan Genocide in particular (Desforges 1999; Fujii 2008; 
Straus 2006; Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), we lack a comprehensive overview of civilian 
participation in genocide and politicide in the 20th century.    
The issue of civilian participation is at the heart of one of the most important questions when 
it comes to mass killing – why does it take place? Valentino’s 2005 book Mass Killing and 
Genocide in the 20th Century dismisses structural theories of mass killing, and argues that it 
should be seen as a strategic choice by the leaders of a government to achieve their objectives 
when other methods have failed (2-3). As a crucial part of this work, he argues that mass 
killing only requires a small number of participants, and that the majority of the population 
either indirectly cooperates with the killing or simply stands by (31-39), asserting that “large 
numbers of civilians almost never play a major role in the killing itself” (35). However, it is 
possible to accept his thesis that mass killing is a strategic choice – rather than a result of 
‘primordial hatred’ – whilst questioning his argument that civilians rarely take part. 
Civilian participation and their mobilisation by the state is an issue that goes unexamined 
though empirical analysis in the literature. While, as mentioned above, literature on 
individual instances often makes clear whether civilians participated, there are no broad 
examinations of the degree to which the civilian population of a state has participated in a 
mass killing campaign run by its government, or in which cases the government has called 
upon them to do so. Having no clear overview of these questions makes it impossible to 
adequately examine potential causes of participation. This work intends to fill that gap by 
establishing such an overview, and by testing various hypotheses providing the beginnings of 
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an answer to the research question of under what conditions and in which types of killing do 
civilians participate in geno-politicide?  
The method for answering this question is a broad examination of 21 recognised instances of 
genocide and politicide between 1955-2002, determining whether the state mobilised the 
population to participate in the killing, and whether significant numbers of civilians did so. 
Other factors of these instances are also examined, including the type of regime, the type of 
killing, and presence of ethnic conflict. This allows for potential explanations of participation 
to be tested, and for a closer examination of instances in which we see civilian participation. 
This is by no means an in-depth look into each instance, which would require an immense 
amount of field research. However, this overview of the historical record through both 
primary and secondary sources not only allows for Valentino’s assertion to be tested, but for 
greater insight into variance in dynamics across instances of mass killing.  
Definitions 
Before embarking on a broader discussion of the literature, it is necessary to precisely define 
the exact terms used and what they are understood to mean. A vast number of terms are used 
in the literature to refer to mass killing, sometimes to indicate the same phenomenon, and 
sometimes with crucial and subtle differences. These include: democide (Rummel 1995), 
genocide (Power 2002), geno-politicide (Harff 2003), genocidal massacres (Kiernan 2009), 
mass indiscriminate violence (Van der Maat 2015), mass killing (Valentino 2005; Bellamy 
2012), and mass atrocities (Osiel 2009). It is therefore important to define exactly which 
instances of mass killing are taken up in this thesis. 
Firstly, the main focus of this work is on campaigns of genocide or politicide directed by the 
state or “territorially based nationalist or revolutionary movement[s]” (Harff 2003, 58)1. This 
rules out massacres carried out by non-territorially based insurgents, but also “collectively 
organized massacres and pogroms” (Owens, Su, and Snow 2012, 78). As Owens et al. point 
out, this second type of killing is a different phenomenon, and can exist alongside a state-led 
campaign of killing (78). It can be argued that by not considering pogroms, the results of the 
research will be biased towards the conclusion that civilians rarely participate. However, the 
focus of this thesis is not the dynamics of how ordinary people can turn to violence, mob 
                                                          
1 What Harff is highlighting here is “situations in which at least one party to a civil war systematically uses 
deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its opponents” (58). This therefore encompasses actors such 
as UNITA in the Angolan Civil War, or Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and draws a (somewhat arbitrary) line 
between them and insurgents outside of a state of civil war who do not exercise significant control over territory.   
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dynamics, or small-scale massacres. What is being investigated is the strategies employed by 
the state once it has decided to embark on a campaign of genocide or politicide. To what 
extent do they attempt to mobilise civilians to assist in this effort, and how do civilians 
respond to this pressure? This also has the practical benefit of allowing for a focus on a 
clearly defined and accepted range of cases. 
Secondly, this research focuses on cases of genocide or politicide, defined by Harff as:  
“the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by 
governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending 
authorities— that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or 
politicized ethnic group.” (2003, 58). 
These criteria focus on victims who are targeted on the basis of a self or ascribed group 
identity – tribe, ethnicity, class, political affiliation – rather than their (alleged) actions. 
Again, this line can appear somewhat arbitrary. However, I rely here on Harff’s distinction 
that politicide takes place when a government decides that the only way to deal with its 
opponents is to destroy them to the extent that they cease to function as a group (58). This 
therefore rules out broader mass killings with no intent of destroying a certain group, defined 
by Valentino as “the intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants” (10). 
Finally, it also neglects predicable, but not intended mass deaths due to disease or famine. 
This route has been chosen for a number of reasons, among them sheer practicality. Focusing 
on a clearly defined subset of mass killings – geno-politicides – allows for the issue to be 
dealt with within the limited scope of this thesis. In addition, working with an existing 
recognised dataset supports the legitimacy and relevance of the work.  
Finally, it is important to clarify four terms: geno-politicide, civilian, participation, and 
mobilisation. Firstly, despite the unwieldy nature of Harff’s term geno-politicide (or 
“genocide and politicide”), I have chosen to maintain its use, as it is sometimes necessary to 
differentiate between genocide – targeting “a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” 
(United Nations 1951) – and politicide, the victims of which are a politically defined group 
(Harff 2003). While broader terms such as mass killing or mass atrocities may sometimes be 
used throughout, these should be understood to be stand-ins for genocidal or politicidal 
killing, unless otherwise noted. Secondly, civilians are defined as any individual not a 
member of the armed forces, paramilitary organisations, government organised militia, or law 
enforcement (ICRC 1977, Article 43, 50). This definition will be further discussed below in 
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the concepts section. Participation in geno-politicide here refers to active participation. 
Besides killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in 
killing, knowingly providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or 
identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 2005, 37), as well as rape, torture, or severe 
physical harm. Specific ways of participation are discussed below under concepts. 
Mobilisation refers to government efforts to reward, encourage, or coerce participation, and 
will also be discussed below. 
Literature review 
Within this thesis a distinction will be made between two categories – civilian participation 
and civilian mobilisation. Investigating the causes of participation requires two things: 
understanding how people can commit acts of horrific violence against unarmed strangers, 
and understanding why they would commit these acts against those specific strangers in those 
specific circumstances. Civilian mobilisation is a separate, but equally key issue. Here we 
must investigate why the state decided to mobilise civilians, as well as why this call was one 
that civilians responded to. In essence this is only three interlinked questions:  
• Why do states mobilise civilians to commit violence? 
• Why do civilians kill other civilians? 
• Why do civilians participate in geno-politicide in response to a specific mobilisation? 
In this section I will review the literature on the first two questions. The first to be discussed 
is the best covered: why people commit acts of violence. This is analysed from both a 
psychological and a group/societal perspective. The second question is the more strategic one 
of why governments would seek to delegate or outsource killing. While the literature 
primarily discusses delegation to militias, I extrapolate certain conclusions to civilian 
participation on the basis on specific instances. Finally, I will argue that a broad overview of 
20th century geno-politicides and the ability to compare between cases is necessary to answer 
the final question.  
Before beginning this discussion, it is worth reiterating that a great deal of the thematic 
literature on the issue of why individuals – soldier or civilian – participate in mass killing 
draws heavily on the extremely well studied examples of Rwanda and Nazi Germany.2 Rarely 
do scholars studying geno-politicide as a whole use as their primary example killing during 
                                                          
2 Examples include Semelin 2007, Anderson 2017, Valentino 2005. 
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the Cultural Revolution in China or the mass killing of communists in Indonesia in 1965-66.3 
This risks either assuming that these cases can serve as models for all other cases of geno-
politicide, or in the case of civilian participation that Rwanda in particular is sui generis. It is 
also important to note that, similar to this thesis, the study of genocide is often limited to the 
20th century or even the post-Second World War period (Power 2002; Valentino 2005; 
Rummel 1995; Gerlach 2010; Harff 2003).4 This is understandable, given the relative lack of 
older historical data, and the difficulty of assessing whether killing met the criteria of 
genocide. However, Kiernan’s work on genocide throughout history provides ample evidence 
– though the conclusion is not explicitly drawn – that prior to the 20th century civilians have 
participated in significant numbers, especially in settler and colonial genocides (2009). 
Expanding the cases used for theorising further back into history could therefore provide 
greater insight into this question. 
It is after the case of the Rwandan genocide in particular, with its high level of civilian 
participation, that research has flourished on the dynamics that might bring ordinary people to 
commit such crimes. One approach taken here is the psychological. This goes back to the 
famous Milgram experiment, which demonstrated that “the tendency to obey those whom we 
perceive to be legitimate authorities” could lead people to the point of delivering what they 
believed to be eventually deadly electric shocks to a stranger (Milgram 1963, 378). The 
theory that the desire to obey authority will override basic moral considerations such as those 
against killing is one that we find in Browning’s ground-breaking study of German 
policemen’s killing of Jews (2001). The consolation provided to men tasked with executing 
the women and children of Jósefzów is that “orders are orders” (58) – while some men 
avoided killing, not a single one attempted to argue against their orders (55-70). Here we also 
see a perhaps even more powerful factor in convincing people to kill – the fear of the 
judgement of peers. The most powerful influence on the minds of the police in Jósefzów was 
the desire not to appear as a ‘coward’ in front of their fellow soldiers, whom they had just 
met (71-72). This desire not to stand out from the crowd is something that we see in analyses 
of the killing in Rwanda as well, where individuals described the fear of rejection or mockery 
                                                          
3 While Valentino discusses the Cultural Revolution (130-132), he fails to confront the objection to his thesis 
that it demonstrates, even while describing the lack of control the government had over the Red Guards. He also 
admits that the Indonesian killings do not fit in his typology of mass killing (70), but does not investigate this 
further. 
4 See Harff for a discussion of the post-war focus in particular (2003, 59)  
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as well as the positive feeling of solidarity that the “killer groups” brought (Smeulers and 
Hoex 2010, 445). 
This factor of peer pressure can also be seen on a broader level in societal factors and the 
power of group bonds. This goes beyond the individual, and looks at the role of group ties 
and obligations to the community to examine why people participated in the killing. Fujii, for 
example, highlights the ease with which in the Rwandan Genocide individuals went along 
with group decisions that Tutsis needed to be killed (2008, 594). Those she calls ‘joiners’ saw 
themselves as powerless in the face of the group, especially when confronted by calls to 
action from family members (2008). The “social order” had changed, and society now 
revolved around the collective project of killing Tutsis (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445). Gong 
provides insight into similar dynamics of collective violence during the Cultural Revolution, 
focusing on the importance of groups (2003). Students participating in the killing and torture 
of ‘enemies’ found it necessary to commit performative acts of violence in order to 
demonstrate their commitment to the group, and protect themselves from accusations of 
weakness (122-125). Gerlach raises this to the level of entire societies with his concept of 
“extremely violent societies” (Gerlach 2010). His work adds a much-needed degree of 
complexity to the discussion of mass killing, emphasising the “multi-causal” nature of killing 
and the need to place it in broader societal context (3). 
However, while the above discussion of why civilians may participate provides insight into 
the group dynamics of such killing, this ‘why’ is focused on the micro-level decisions faced 
by individuals once the circumstances have arisen in which they are called upon to join the 
killing. It does not provide insight into why such circumstances might arise. While Gerlach in 
particular goes further, arguing that societal factors lead to his extremely violent societies, on 
the basis of his research it is still hard to explain why some societies become ‘extremely 
violent’ and some don’t (Finstuen 2012, 174) The discussion must also be combined with the 
question of mobilisation – what led the government to mobilise these civilians? Participation 
does not arise in a vacuum. The Chinese state under Mao explicitly called upon civilians to 
take action against ‘class enemies’ in an increasingly explicit and strident manner (Dikotter 
2016, 53-71). The Rwandan government used the radio to mobilize and organise civilians 
(Desforges 1999, 190-192). Our knowledge of the micro-level dynamics does not explain the 
strategic thinking behind mobilising civilians, or what other factors may have led them to 
participate. It is to this point that we now turn. 
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The issue of civilian mobilisation immediately raises a difficult question: why would the state 
be willing to relinquish its monopoly on the use of force (DeMeritt 2015, 432)? This question 
is mainly raised in the literature with regard to militias, but is surely even more relevant when 
it comes to civilians. Empowering organised armed groups already poses a challenge to 
internal sovereignty, but to encourage civilians en masse to carry out violence risks chaos, as 
can be seen in China, where the Cultural Revolution devolved into conflict between the army 
and various factions of the Red Guards (Dikotter 2016). One obvious reason such 
mobilisation may take place is that the government simply has no choice. In instances where 
state power is significantly weakened, militias or mass violence may be the only way for the 
state to project force (Ahram 2014, 492-493). However, this is by no means a complete 
explanation, as state violence and civilian or militia violence can also complement each other 
(Staniland 2015). Here three categories of potential explanations for state mobilisation of 
militia or civilian violence will be discussed: tactical, deceptive, and ideological. 
The first and most discussed explanation in the literature is tactical – when mobilising 
militias is the most efficient way for a state to achieve its goals. Jentzsch et al., for example, 
discuss a number of explanations for the use of militias in armed conflicts (2015). One of 
these is the need for greater efficiency in counterinsurgency (759), which is a finding 
supported throughout the literature (Biberman 2016, 2). Locally recruited militia will have 
greater knowledge of their own region and culture, helping the government to be more 
precise in its counterinsurgency (2016). This is a tactic commonly seen in counterinsurgent 
geno-politicides, where the state security forces rely on local auxiliaries, often of the same 
ethnicity as the victims, to assist in fighting, killing, or intelligence gathering (HRW 1993; 
CAVR 2013). A similar efficiency effect could be expected for civilian mobilisation, 
especially when the victims are widely scattered amongst those who might be able to kill 
them, such as in Rwanda (Desforges 1999, 13, 191). 
More closely related to mobilisation for geno-politicide is the second category of deception. 
The main aim here is creating plausible deniability (Jentzsch et al. 2015, 759). By creating 
greater distance between government perpetrators and victims through the use of 
intermediaries, governments make it harder to establish accountability (Carey, Colaresi, and 
Mitchell 2015). Sometimes this distance may be real rather than a façade, and the government 
may truly lack operational control of the groups or individuals it has knowingly set in motion 
(Campbell 2000, 19). This motive of deception is especially relevant in cases of geno-
politicide rather than civil war, as it has been suggested that particularly extreme violence is 
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more likely to be delegated (13).5 The effect of this delegation when sections of the civilian 
population are mobilised will only be heightened, as the violence can then more convincingly 
be portrayed as out of the state’s control (Ahram 2014, 493). However, we must question 
who this plausible deniability is for. Carey et al. discuss both internal accountability in (semi-
)democracies and external accountability to international actors (2015, 852-854). Deniability 
is unlikely to explain this mobilisation in autocracies that do not have to fear foreign 
intervention, such as China during the Cultural Revolution.  
The third category, advanced by Staniland, focuses on the ideology of the mobilising state. 
Staniland looks at a wider range of government behaviour towards militias, ranging from 
suppression to collaboration (2015). He highlights how these depend on how the state’s 
ideology and its compatibility with that of a militia affects the “political meaning” given to an 
armed group (776). This argument can be extended to civilian participation. For example, a 
communist state that emphasises mass participation in politics may be more willing to 
mobilise civilians than a military regime. Strauss argues that the Chinese state in the 1950s 
“[linked] the suppression of counterrevolutionaries...with the mobilization of popular support 
for the regime” (2002, 82). A government or ruling party driven by ethnic ideology may also 
be more willing to enable their co-ethnics to carry out violence, as happened in Rwanda 
(Desforges 1999, 104-105) and Burundi (Lemarchand and Martin 1974, 18). Finally, some 
states may have a tradition of militia or vigilante violence that ascribes a ‘heroic’ political 
meaning to such groups, creating a natural context for the state to mobilise them for geno-
politicide (Ahram 2014, 495). 
Where these two phenomena of mobilisation and participation come together is in the third 
question of the specific context of a geno-politicide where civilian participation took place. 
While governments may attempt mobilisation, and civilians may have the capacity to 
participate, the conditions must be right in an individual situation for the government to 
attempt mobilisation, and the civilians to respond.6 However, as mentioned in the 
introduction, to answer this question of what conditions are necessary there must be clarity 
about when civilian mobilisation and participation has actually taken place. Both Valentino 
(2005, 3) and Gerlach (2010, 12-13) make sweeping statements regarding the lack or 
                                                          
5 This is questioned by Cohen & Nordås, who demonstrate that specifically sexual violence carried out by 
militias does not correspond with reduced sexual violence by state forces (2015) 
6 There is also an alternative possibility, which is that civilians will participate whenever governments attempt to 
mobilise them, and that all that is necessary for participation is incentives or commands from the state. This 
would suggest we will never see mobilisation without participation 
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presence of civilian participation, without any reference to work showing this is the case or 
relying on a small number of cases. Without clear knowledge of in which cases civilian 
participation took place, and in which cases it didn’t, it is impossible to advance explanations 
that also explain why participation did not take place in other instances. This is one of the 
main aims of this thesis – to provide an overview of civilian participation across geno-
politicides throughout the 20th century. With this data, it will then be possible to provide 
insight into the conditions under which we see these phenomena, and to provide explanations 
of their processes.       
Method 
The analysis carried out in this thesis requires specific knowledge of one aspect of a wide 
range of geno-politicides. In order to achieve results that allow for comparison across a 
historical range of incidents, the research method used is a focused, structured comparison of 
21 different cases of geno-politicide for their degree of civilian participation. The objective of 
this research method is to provide broad insight into civilian participation across different 
instances, allowing for an initial testing of the theory that civilians rarely participate in mass 
killing. On the basis of this research, further work could be done into individual cases to 
provide the within-case depth that this study lacks. The dataset employed is a sub-set of a list 
of 37 genocides and politicides between 1955 and 2002 (Harff 2003), one of the more widely 
used sources in the field (Wayman and Tago 2010). The list covers four categories of killing: 
genocide, politicide, politicide with communal victims, and genocide and politicide (within 
the same instance), and is included below. The data behind the list was originally compiled 
by Harff, Gurr, and Marshall for the then State Failure Task Force in 1994 (now Political 
Instability Task Force or PITF), and is available, in an updated form, along with other PITF 
datasets, at the Center for Systemic Peace (Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 2017). Due to 
practical difficulties in finding data on smaller and less well-known geno-politicides, all 
incidences with less than 50 000 deaths (or where the average of the estimated range is below 
50 000) have been excluded.7 In addition, to remain consistent with the list used in Harff 
(2003), and with the literature’s general focus on the 20th century, no geno-politicides 
beginning in the 21st century have been included,  
 
                                                          
7 This leads to a slight over-representation of the category “genocide and politicide” (29% rather than 19% of 
the total), and an under-representation of the category “politicide” (23% rather than 32% of the total). This and 
any other potential biases will be discussed below under limitations.  
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Table 1 – Genocides and Politicide from 1955-2002 
Country and Dates Nature of Episode Estimated Number of 
Victims 
Sudan 1956-72 Politicide with communal victims 400 000 – 600 000 
China 1959 Genocide and politicide  65 000 
South Vietnam 1965-75 Politicide 400 000 – 500 000 
Burundi 1965-728 Politicide with communal victims 140 000 
Indonesia 1965-66 Genocide and politicide  500 000 – 1 000 000 
China 1966-75 Politicide  400 000 – 850 000 
Pakistan 1971 Politicide with communal victims 1 000 000 – 3 000 000 
Uganda 1971-79 Politicide and genocide 50 000 – 400 000 
Philippines 1972-76 Politicide with communal victims 60 000 
Angola 1975-2001 Politicide  500 000 
Cambodia 1975-79 Politicide and genocide 1 900 000 – 3 500 000 
Indonesia 1975-92 Politicide with communal victims 100 000 – 200 000 
Guatemala 1978-96 Politicide and genocide 60 000 – 200 000 
Afghanistan 1978-92 Politicide 1 800 000 
El Salvador 1980-89 Politicide  40 000 – 60 000 
Uganda 1980-86 Politicide and genocide  200 000 – 500 000 
Sudan 1983-2002 Politicide with communal victims 2 000 000 
Iraq 1988-91 Politicide with communal victims 180 000 
Bosnia 1992-95 Genocide 225 000 
Burundi 1993 Genocide 50 000 
Rwanda 1994 Genocide 500 000 – 1 000 000 
Source: Adapted from Harff 2003, 60, Table 1.   
 
To ensure the cases are analysed in the same manner, a codebook was used (see Appendix 
A).9 Each case was coded for two factors, whether or not civilians were mobilised, and 
whether or not civilians participated. In addition, political participation was coded separately 
to civilian mobilisation and participation (see explanation below). Each factor was 
                                                          
8 In the coding the duration of the killing in Burundi has been reduced to 1972-73. See Burundi’s coding entry in 
Appendix B for discussion. 
9 Further detail on all aspects of the coding discussed here can be found in the codebook 
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determined through three methods which were coded for. Each method is a separate and 
independent path to the factor; that is to say that if one method was answered in the 
affirmative, the factor was coded as present. The sources used for the coding are a mixture of 
primary and secondary sources. Where possible, primary reports from international 
institutions, NGOs, or truth commissions were used. Secondary sources were also used. 
These sources were found through a process starting with encyclopaedic sources (Sciences Po 
Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network; A Century of Genocide by Totten & 
Parsons), and additional sources were found from the bibliographies of the relevant entries. 
When necessary, searches for relevant terms were also made through the Leiden University 
Library. The coding of each instance contains a notes section in which any issues with 
finding sources are discussed, along with any discrepancies between sources and how they 
were resolved.  
This process allowed each geno-politicide to be coded for whether conditions were present 
that would mobilise civilians, and whether they participated in the killing. Before carrying 
out the coding, it was impossible to say whether these factors were independent of each other. 
Coding in this way also provides additional transparency. The first factor of mobilisation was 
answered by the following questions: 
1. Did the government call on civilians to join the killing? 
2. Was there societal/peer pressure on civilians to participate? 
3. Were there material incentives for civilians to actively participate? 
These questions allow for different methods of mobilisation, from the direct to indirect. All 
three were answered on a 3-point scale, with an additional score for no evidence:10 
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents) 
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)  
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space   
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space  
                                                          
10 An important point to note for both mobilisation and participation is that for nearly all instances it was 
difficult to find sources that explicitly state these factors were not seen. In this case, sources providing a 
comprehensive account of the dynamics of the geno-politicide, but not mentioning any civilian participation will 
be coded as “no evidence”. 
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Each method of mobilisation is independent, meaning that the score for the factor of civilian 
mobilisation as a whole is not cumulative. Therefore, a score of 0.5 or 1 for at least one of the 
methods will lead to a score for civilian mobilisation of 0.5 or 1 respectively. 
The second question of participation was answered by the following questions: 
1. Did genocidal civilian militias participate in the killing? 
2. Did civil society organisations participate in the killing? 
3. Did civilians participate in the killing on an ad hoc basis? 
These questions allow for different methods of participation: by forming civilian led militias 
to participate in the killing, by participating through existing civil society organisations such 
as religious or even criminal groups, or by killing in unorganised groups or as individuals. 
The concepts section below will expand on and justify the definitions of these groups. This 
factor will be scored in the exact same way as civilian mobilisation. The final factor, political 
participation, was scored through answering one question: did political parties participate in 
the killing. As discussed below under the concepts section, this separation of political 
participation from civilian participation was necessary to ensure greater accuracy in coding. 
The result of the research into these factors is therefore an overview for each geno-politicide 
of the extent to which civilians were mobilised to participate, and the extent to which they 
participated. 
Other characteristics of the geno-politicide are also coded for, in addition to these central 
factors being investigated. This makes it possible to determine whether there are patterns 
linking geno-politicides involving civilian participation. Established datasets were used to 
gather this data.  These factors, and the datasets, are as follows: 
• Duration of killing (CSP 2017) 
• The severity of the killing (CSP 2017)  
• Type of killing (Harff 2003) 
• Regime type (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) 
• Communist regime (secondary literature) 
• Presence of revolutionary war (CSP 2017)11 
                                                          
11 Revolutionary war is defined in the dataset as “episodes of violent conflict between governments and 
politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace 
its leaders, or to seize power in one region” (2017)  
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• Presence of ethnic war (CSP 2017)12 
• Presence of pro-government militias (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013)  
The factors of communism, revolutionary war and ethnic war will be used – in conjunction 
with secondary sources – as proxies to identify the three most common types of mass killing 
Valentino identifies: communist, ethnic and counterguerrilla (2005).  
The analysis of data gathered is qualitative rather than quantitative. The results section 
therefore discusses whether or not the hypotheses can be confirmed, highlights correlations 
between the civilian mobilisation/participation factor and other factors, and attempts to shed 
light on interesting conclusions on the basis of theory, rather than carrying out a quantitative 
statistical analysis. A primary reason for this is the difficulty of getting quantitatively 
significant results from such a small sample size. In addition, reducing these incidents to a 
score for a regression analysis would not allow for a proper degree of nuance in covering 
each instance. Instead, in line with the scope and research objective of this thesis, I aim to 
provide broad insight into patterns that we see across mass killing. 
Concepts 
This section will build on the methodology described above to define the terms being coded 
for, namely civilian mobilisation and civilian participation. This is not merely a 
methodological question, but one that requires careful consideration of what we mean when 
we discuss civilian participation in killing. Civilian participation is the most difficult to 
define, as it touches on often arbitrary distinctions between civilian and combatant, and first 
requires discussion of the definition of militias. While civilian mobilisation is less 
conceptually difficult, it is still necessary to clearly define how governments can mobilise 
their populations. This mobilisation may be direct, as we see in the first method. However, it 
may also be through the government encouraging and permitting violent dynamics to arise in 
society, or allowing perpetrators to plunder their victims or take their property.   
Government call 
The first method through while civilians can be mobilized is through the government calling 
upon them to participate in killing. This call must be concrete. Civilians can be told publicly 
through government channels that participation in the killing is encouraged, expected, or a 
                                                          
12 Ethnic war is defined in the dataset PITF as “episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, 
ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major 
changes in their status.” (2017) 
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duty, such as in Rwanda (Desforges 1999, 190-191). Alternately, the mobilisation can be 
more direct and private, such as Indonesia, where the military coordinated actions with and 
requested assistance from civilian militias, political parties and vigilantes (Robinson 2018). 
The full criteria are as follows:  
• Concrete and explicit call by the government or its agents for civilians to participate13  
• Can take the form of public statements for a broad audience that participation is 
encouraged, expected, or a duty 
• Can take the form of the government or its agents asking or encouraging other 
organisations or individuals directly to participate – either privately or in public. 
• Euphemisms broadly understood by the population as referring to killing – and 
explained as such in secondary literature – should be coded positively 
• If individuals are coerced into participation – by any means – this should be coded 
positively. 
Societal/peer pressure 
The second method is through societal or peer pressure. It must be emphasised that this is not 
pressure from other members of a military unit an individual has joined. As discussed in the 
literature review, it is a well-known phenomenon that individuals can carry out killing out of 
fear of the judgement of their peers. However, the focus here is on a wider pressure, arising 
not from comrades, but from society at large and individuals with whom an individual has no 
prior relationship. This can take the form of pressure from the local community (Fujii 2008) 
or a society-wide perception that being a good citizen (or member of an ethnic group) means 
to participate in killing (Lemarchand 2009, 272). While this pressure stems directly from an 
individual’s fellow civilians, it relies on a government campaign to turn society against a 
group. The full criteria are as follows: 
• Pressure on individual from society as a whole or individuals in the community to 
participate in the geno-politicide 
• Not pressure from other individuals within a constituted unit or organisation 
                                                          
13 Participation in geno-politicide – or ‘participation in killing’ – here refers to active participation. Besides 
killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in killing, knowingly 
providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 
37), as well as rape, torture, or severe physical harm. 
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• Can take the form of a society wide cessation of ordinary life in which killing comes 
to dominate society and is even seen as a duty14  
• Can take the form of civilians pressuring other civilians to join the killing 
Material incentives  
The third method is motivation by material gains. This involves civilians being able to profit 
directly through their participation in killing by being able to loot their victims’ possessions 
or property or gain rewards from the government. The connection between killing and reward 
must be clear and direct. This kind of mobilisation may be less closely linked to either 
explicit action by the government or other actor in society, and may take the form of an 
acceptance by the state of looting or forced takeover of property. However, there may also be 
explicit calls by state actors to loot and plunder (Desforges 1999, 184). The full criteria are as 
follows: 
• Civilians are able to profit directly through participation in the geno-politicide 
through material gains 
• This can take the form of looting or stealing land, property, or goods from victims  
• It can also take the form of direct material rewards by the government for 
participation 
• The connection between participation and reward must be direct 
Once civilians have been mobilised, it is necessary to examine in what ways they 
participated. Analysing the participation of civilians and organised groups of civilians in 
geno-politicide is a discussion which takes place in a grey zone between military and civilian 
violence, where it can be difficult to determine what civilian participation actually is. This 
study aims to avoid a focus on the delegation of killing to irregular troops or militias rather 
than the regular armed forces (see DeMeritt 2015), and instead examine the phenomenon of 
civilians taking part in killing. The difficulty, however, in defining this phenomenon, is that 
all civilian participation in violence in an organised fashion often becomes subsumed under 
the category of militia – and according to the laws of war, these groups are armed forces 
(ICRC 1977, Article 43). In the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, for example, the 
following types of organisations are all discussed as pro-government militias: government 
organised irregular troops, ex-rebels fighting for the government, village defence forces, and 
                                                          
14 Compare examples of Rwanda (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445) or Burundi (Lemarchand 2009, 272) 
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vigilante groups (Carey and Mitchell 2016). These are clearly extremely different types of 
organisations with very different internal dynamics – a death squad consisting of ex-soldiers 
and organised by the intelligence services is very different to civilians who have been 
provided with arms to defend their village. The broad nature of this term therefore makes it 
difficult to define the focus of this thesis – the participation of individuals not a member of an 
IHL defined armed group in killing. In addition, the fact that these definitions largely revolve 
around participation in an armed conflict is not always appropriate for a situation in which no 
armed conflict is taking place. This section will briefly provide definitions of militias used 
commonly in the literature, then discuss how distinctions will be drawn between this type of 
violence and civilian participation in this thesis. 
In his discussion on definitions used in the field, Malejacq highlights a divide between two 
definitions. The first is provided by Carey et al. (2013), and links the concept of a militia 
closely to the government, focusing on “pro-government militias (PGMs)” (Malejacq 2017). 
Carey’s exact definition of a PGM is as follows: 
“1. Is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government 
(national or subnational), 
2. Is identified as not being part of the regular security forces, 
3. Is armed, and 
4. Has some level of organisation” (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013, 250)  
This definition is opposed to some degree by Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger in their work 
on militias in civil wars (2015). They posit a weaker relationship between the state and the 
militia, which may have its own interests (759). Rather than requiring that the militia be 
clearly linked to the state, they focus on the fact that they fight the rebels (756). While it is 
unclear how useful this definition may be in a situation outside of civil war, when the 
‘enemy’ is less clearly defined, this questioning of militias as an arm of the state is important. 
While these definitions different in the degree to which they posit a link between the 
government and militia – with the first assuming the militia operates in support of the 
government, and the second on the ‘mutual enemy’ they share (Malejacq 2017) – both 
demonstrate the close and potentially confusing nature of this connection. This is exacerbated 
when we also consider death squads, which have played a crucial role in mass killings across 
the world (Campbell 2000, 1). Campbell highlights the difficult work of differentiating death 
squads, which generally have the support of both the state and private forces, from vigilantes. 
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While the latter is more of a “grassroots” effort by private individuals – closer to the topic of 
this thesis – they are still often connected to government agents (2-3). What he sees as unique 
about death squads is that they are covert, but not secret, meaning that while their 
organisation and backing is shrouded in secrecy, their actions are extremely violent and 
public (4-5).  
Given that the difficulty in differentiating between state and civilian is therefore essential to 
these very concepts, it is important to establish exactly how they will be used in this thesis to 
ensure that what is measured is the deliberate participation in geno-politicide by individuals 
who are not members of the security forces. The following section will therefore define the 
exact criteria that will be used in the coding of geno-politicides. To ensure the highest degree 
of reliability possible, existing definitions have been used where possible, with additional 
criteria to focus on civilian participation. Three different possibilities are considered: 
genocidal civilian militias (GCMs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and ad hoc 
groups/individuals. All of these are independent ways to measure civilian participation, and 
the presence of any one of them will be seen as sufficient evidence of this phenomenon. It is 
important to note that these civilian groups can still operate at the direction of government 
actors. Examples of this include members of a government militia taking the lead of an ad 
hoc mob (Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 442), or the army instructing GCMs on who to target 
(Robinson 2018). Such instructions or directions do not take away the civilian nature of the 
group. This only happens when the civilian group becomes integrated into the security forces. 
Finally, the role of civilian members of political parties will also be discussed. 
Genocidal civilian militias (GCMs) 
One form of civilian killing in geno-politicides may be when civilians form together in armed 
organised groups to participate in killing. These groups here are termed ‘genocidal civilian 
militias’. Their definition is based on Carey’s definition of PGMs, which is useful for its clear 
criteria. However, similarly to how Jentzsch et al. focus on the anti-rebel role of militias 
rather than the state connection, I replace this state connection with the requirement that the 
militia has as its primary goal the killing of the target group. In addition, the group must have 
been created by civilians with a civilian membership once the killing has started. This is to 
ensure that the coding reflects groups that formed specifically to participate in the killing – 
this makes it easier to distinguish between GCMs and PGMs. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, to ensure that this group is indeed comprised of civilians (according to the ICRC 
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definition), they must not be fighting in an armed conflict. Their only violent actions must be 
directed at the unarmed victims of the geno-politicide. Without this distinction, it is 
impossible to distinguish pro-government militias who would more commonly be seen as 
combatants – such as paramilitaries in Bosnia (Helsinki Watch 1992, 36-38) – from civilians 
who have organised themselves to perpetrate geno-politicide against a civilian population – 
such as the Red Guards in China (Gong 2003, 120-121). These additional criteria ensure that 
such a group reflects the knowing and intentional participation of the civilian population in 
the geno-politicide. The full criteria are as follows: 
• Not part of the regular security forces, and membership not drawn from the military, 
security forces, or law enforcement 
• Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party 
• Not fighting in an armed conflict 
• Armed 
• Has some level of organisation 
• Participating in killing of members of the defined target group  
• Created at the start of the geno-politicide or once it began 
• Created with the most important aim being to carry out geno-politicide 
• The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced15 
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) 
The second phenomenon considered is the participation of existing civilian organisations in 
the killing. These groups must meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation: “all 
non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organise 
themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain.” (OECD 2011, 10). This includes, 
among others, “community-based organisations and village associations, environmental 
groups, women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-based organisations” (10). These 
groups differ from PGMs in that they must have other societal roles or reasons for existence 
besides fighting, and their members must meet the ICRC definition of civilians. They differ 
                                                          
15 While all coercion is coded as civilian mobilisation, it is coded differently for participation. Pressure to 
participate of the sort commonly referred to in the literature, such as peer pressure or losing respect in the 
community (Browning 1998) will be coded as participation. However, if individuals are forced to take part in 
the face of serious consequences such as imprisonment, torture, or death (e.g. Guatemala (CEH 1999)), this will 
not be coded as participation, given that such it describes less the overall conditions of the killing and more the 
immediate threat.  
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from GCMs in that they can also have been created before the killing began, and that they 
must have a purpose beyond killing. Criminal groups or gangs involved in other types of 
crime besides the killing of the target group – organised crime, extortion, smuggling, etc. – 
will also be coded as civil society organisations.16. The full criteria are as follows: 
• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group 
• Created either before or during the geno-politicide  
• Meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian  
• Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party 
• Must have other societal roles and reasons for existence besides killing 
• The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced 
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Ad hoc groups/individuals 
The final phenomenon considered is that of ad hoc groups or even individuals participating in 
the killing. These groups lack the cohesion and organisation of GCMs and CSOs – they have 
no clear membership for instance. In addition, individuals who join in the killing without 
belonging to any group will be considered under this category. The full criteria are as 
follows: 
• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group 
• No defined membership or organisational structure 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
• In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.  
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Or 
• Individual carrying out killing 
• Individual must meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
Political parties  
                                                          
16 See Beittinger-Lee 2013 for a discussion of criminal groups and other ‘uncivil’ organisations as part of civil 
society, especially Chapter 2 “An uneasy correlation: (Un)civil Society and Democracy”  
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Another group that can be comprised of civilians is political parties, both ruling and 
otherwise, defined here as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at 
elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public 
office” (Sartori 2005, 56). This is a difficult area methodologically for three reasons. Firstly, 
the ruling party’s organisation may be intertwined with the various militias or security forces 
serving the government, making it difficult to draw a meaningful line between party and 
security forces. Secondly, certain wings of the party, if armed, may cross the line into being 
pro-government militias, as in the case of the Interahamwe in Rwanda, which became a 
cohesive militia armed and trained by the military and fully subordinated to the government 
(Desforges 1999, 46; Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 441). Finally, in party-based regimes, the 
party and government may be indistinguishable, with all government functionaries and civil 
servants being party members (Sartori 2005, 40). This makes it difficult to determine whether 
perpetrators were joining in a government led campaign of killing, or part of the government 
carrying it out. At the same time, it is important to maintain an objective definition of civilian 
that can easily be replicated, hence the reliance on the ICRC definition. Drawing a distinction 
between civilian party members and the security forces or PGMs also serves the aim of this 
research in determining to what extent the perpetrators of geno-politicide can be found 
outside of those who are employed to carry out violence. Therefore, the participation of 
members of political parties will be coded separately to that of the military or security forces, 
but also separately from other civilian participation, to ensure transparency. However, to 
avoid including the entire government in this category, a line will be drawn between party 
members or functionaries (civilians) and civil servants or government officials, who for the 
sake of this research will not be included as civilians. If there is clear evidence that a 
particular wing of the party has gone beyond any political function to operate as a pro-
government militia (as in the case of the Interahamwe), it will not be coded. This aims for a 
focus on the civilian popular membership of such parties. The full criteria are as follows: 
• Organisation meets Sartori’s definition of a political party 
• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group  
• Carrying out this killing as an organisation, rather than on an individual basis  
• Created either before or during the geno-politicide 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
• Members carrying out killing do not have a role in the government 
• In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.  
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• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Hypotheses 
The literature on the causes of genocide – as discussed above – is extensive, and provides 
potential avenues for exploration of civilian participation. The following hypotheses for when 
civilian mobilisation or participation may take place are based on this existing research. They 
aim to test the degree to which civilian participation and mobilisation take place, the 
conditions under which they may take place, and the effect they may have on the killing.  
The first hypothesis focuses on Valentino’s assertion that “large numbers of civilians almost 
never play a major role in the killing itself” (Valentino 2005, 35). As discussed above, he 
argues that mass killing is planned and carried out by a small number of perpetrators, and that 
little more than passive acceptance is required from the civilian population (31-39). For the 
purpose of formulation and to ensure a fair test, “major role” will be interpreted as consistent 
participation. In addition, it seems plausible to interpret “almost never” as ≤ 10% of total 
cases. In this case that would entail at most two geno-politicides involving consistent civilian 
participation. 
H1: ≤ 10% of cases of geno-politicide will involve consistent civilian participation  
The literature review distinguished between civilian mobilisation and civilian participation, 
and argued that conditions must be right for civilians to respond to the government’s attempts 
at mobilisation. However, it may also be the case that civilians will always respond to 
mobilisation. Valentino makes clear that it is very rare for civilians to resist a government 
committing genocide (2005, 38-39). As discussed in the literature review, there are also 
powerful psychological and group factors that make it difficult for people to resist the 
pressure to carry out killing. Given these factors, we can suggest that mobilisation will 
always lead to participation. 
H2: Mobilisation will be accompanied by a corresponding degree of participation 
A common type of geno-politicide is counter-guerrilla killing, which has been coded for 
through the proxy variable of the presence of revolutionary war. Counter-guerrilla geno-
politicides take place when armies fighting insurgencies attempt to “drain the sea”, and 
separate the guerrillas from their support base by destroying or moving the population 
(Valentino 2005, 200). These actions are carried out by security forces fighting against the 
guerrillas among a population opposed to the government. This location of the conflict in 
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‘enemy territory’ may reduce the numbers of civilians who would be willing to be mobilised 
to participate. The fact that this killing also takes place in an active conflict may also limit the 
killing to combatants, and make it difficult for civilians to become involved. Testing this 
theory means determining whether revolutionary war was present in the country at the time 
the genocide began.  
H3: Counter-guerrilla geno-politicides will not involve civilian mobilisation or participation  
Ethnic cleansing geno-politicides involve governing elites deciding that “large-scale violence 
is the most practical way to accomplish ethnic cleansing” (Valentino 2005, 155), or the 
“[reorganization] of society at the expense of certain groups” (153). While ethnic cleansing 
may bring to mind the physical displacement and expulsion of a population, it can also take 
the form of mass killing if expulsion is impractical or will not alleviate the perceived threat 
(157). This type of killing has been coded for through the proxy value of ethnic war, 
assuming that ethnic war is a sign of significant ethnic tensions. While theories highlighting 
the role of existing ethnic cleavages in society are unconvincing in predicting or explaining 
genocide (Mueller 2000), they may be able to explain why civilians might take part. Ethnic 
group identities may make it easier for the population to identify the victim group, and may 
also lead to greater identification among the section of the population sharing ethnicity with 
the governing elites (Horowitz 1985, 293-296).  
H4: Ethnic cleansing geno-politicides will involve civilian participation. 
Another way to approach this same question of the mobilising role of ethnicity is through a 
focus on the nature of the target group, rather than the goals of the perpetrators. Geno-
politicides in which the target group is distinguished through their ethnicity – or nationality, 
religion or race, in the official definition – rather than political beliefs may lead to greater 
civilian participation. In an autocracy, groups targeted for their political beliefs are most 
likely to be oppressed simply for their opposition to the regime. Given the lack of threat this 
poses to the majority of the population, the targeting of political opponents is unlikely to 
cause such extreme acts as killing among ordinary people. In other words, if the target group 
is defined solely by their political beliefs, this may fail to arouse sufficient desire for 
participation among the population. 
H5: Politicides will not involve civilian participation.    
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A potential cause of civilian mobilization is a desire to accomplish the killing quickly. 
Despite the power of the state, sometimes irregular forces may serve as an additional “force 
multiplier” (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015, 759). This may be especially necessary 
if the government perceives an acute threat from the target group (Valentino 2005, 68), 
requiring swift action against the group as a whole  If the government does not have the 
ability to attack or destroy the target group swiftly enough through using the security forces 
alone, they may attempt to mobilize the civilian population to accelerate the killing.  
While this explanation of a potential relationship seems plausible, causation here is tangled. 
While the desire for swift killing may lead to mobilisation, it is the mobilisation that leads to 
the actual swift killing. It may also be the case that the choice to mobilise civilians is 
motivated by other reasons, but leads to a shorter geno-politicide due to the force multiplier 
effect – thus reversing the causal relationship. The hypothesis therefore makes no suggestion 
of causation. 
H6: Geno-politicides involving civilian mobilization will on average be shorter than those 
that do not  
As mentioned above, the state can have uses for irregular forces. There is substantial 
literature on the incentives for the state to create and utilise pro-government militias for 
security or in killing (DeMeritt 2015; Ahram 2011). It is reasonable to assume that these 
same incentives will also lead governments to encourage the participation of genocidal 
civilian militias, civil society organisations, or even civilians on an ad hoc basis. This can be 
caused by the same underlying weakness of the state that makes such delegation necessary, or 
a similar calculus on behalf of the state that civilians will be more efficient than the security 
forces. 
H7: Geno-politicides in countries where PGMs are present will involve civilian mobilisation 
Another form of civilian participation, falling in the grey zone between civilian and state 
actor, is participation by the mass membership of political parties. This goes beyond the work 
of parties through their potential role in the government, and involves the participation of the 
broader party membership with no role in the government. Single party states will make it 
easier for the architects of genocide in the government to mobilise civilians, though this may 
depend on the type of party (Sartori 2005, 197-202). The pervasiveness of the party 
throughout society makes its membership a tempting weapon for the government to use to 
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further their reach during a geno-politicide. Given their identification with the regime, they 
will also be more likely to identify with the reasoning for the killing. 
H8: Geno-politicides carried out by single party regimes will involve political participation 
It is reasonable to assume that the abovementioned ‘force multiplier’ effect of civilian 
mobilisation will increase the reach of the killing. As accounts from the Rwandan genocide 
show, once a large number of community members with local knowledge are involved in the 
killing – even merely by identifying targets – it makes it very difficult for victims to escape 
(Desforges 1999, 13, 191). This hypothesis therefore reverses the variables and suggests that 
geno-politicides with civilian participation will lead to more deaths per year than those which 
do not.  
H9: Civilian participation will lead to a greater monthly average death toll  
Results 
As discussed above, with such a small number of cases it is impossible to provide statistical 
analysis of the hypotheses. This size issue is made more difficult by the degree of variation 
on certain dimensions, as well as the complexity of the issue being studied and the likely 
small effects each variable will have (Salkind 2010). Given that this is a sample of 21 cases 
out of a total population of only 37, the validity of broad quantitative analysis of geno-
politicide as a whole can be brought into question. However, the results still provide clear 
evidence to reject or accept certain hypotheses.  
Table 2 – Presence of civilian mobilisation, participation and political participation 
 Civ. mob. Civ. part.  Pol. part. 
No evidence of occurrence (99) 10 9 12 
No occurrence (0) 2 2 2 
Inconsistent occurrence (0.5) 2 5 1 
Consistent occurrence (1) 7 5 6 
  
As Table 2 indicates, the hypothesis that civilians almost never take part in geno-politicide is 
rejected, as five cases – or approximately 25% of the sample – involved consistent civilian 
participation. Valentino’s assertion is therefore incorrect. However, the majority of cases 
s1342487 
30 
 
(52%) do not involve any civilian participation. The following table provides more 
information on the cases which do.  
Table 3 – Instances of civilian mobilisation, participation and political participation 
Geno-politicide  Civ. mob. Civ. part.  Pol. part. 
Sudan 1956-1972 99 0.5 99 
Indonesia 1965-66 1 1 1 
China 1966-72 1 1 1 
Pakistan 1971 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Burundi 1972-73 1 1 1 
Guatemala 1978-90 1 0.5 99 
El Salvador 1980-89 0.5 0.5 99 
Uganda 1980-86 99 99 1 
Bosnia 1992-95 1 0.5 99 
Burundi 1993 1 1 1 
Rwanda 1994 1 1 1 
 
Five instances stand out for the degree to which mobilisation and participation was present: 
Indonesia 1965-66, China 1966-72, Burundi 1972-73 and 1993, and Rwanda 1993. With the 
exception of the two instances in Burundi, these cases also had at least two of the 
independent methods of mobilisation or participation coded as present.  
Table 4 – Comparison of civilian mobilisation and participation scores 
Country Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
Angola 99 99 
Iraq 0 0 
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Uganda 1971-1979 99 99 
Indonesia 1975-1992 0 0 
Rwanda 1 1 
Guatemala 1 0.5 
China 1966-1975 1 1 
El Salvador 0.5 0.5 
Burundi 1972-73 1 1 
Burundi 1993 1 1 
Cambodia 99 99 
Afghanistan 99 99 
South Vietnam 99 99 
Uganda 1980-1986 99 99 
Sudan 99 99 
Bosnia 1 0.5 
Philippines 99 99 
China 1959 99 99 
Indonesia 1965-66 1 1 
Sudan 1956-1972 99 0.5 
Pakistan 0.5 0.5 
 
The hypothesis that mobilisation will be accompanied by a corresponding degree of 
participation is accepted. As the table above shows, there is only one case in which we see 
participation without mobilisation, and two cases in which consistent mobilisation produces 
only inconsistent participation. In all other cases the two factors correspond perfectly. 
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Table 5 – Counter-guerrilla geno-politicide and civilian participation17 
 No part. Inconsistent 
part. 
Consistent part. Cases 
involving 
participation 
Rev. war 
present 
3 2 0 40%  
Rev. war not 
present 
8 3 5 50%  
 
There is no significant correlation between the presence of revolutionary war and civilian 
participation, especially given the small number of cases with revolutionary war and the 
hypothesis is therefore rejected. However, the results may suggest at least a potential 
connection between counter-guerrilla killing and a lack of some forms of civilian 
participation, given that there are no instances of consistent civilian participation starting 
during revolutionary war. In addition, the specific type of inconsistent participation we see in 
El Salvador and Guatemala is death squads (GCMs) only. We therefore never see CSO or ad 
hoc killing beginning during a revolutionary war.  
Table 6 – Ethnic war and civilian participation 
 No part. Inconsistent 
part. 
Consistent part. Cases 
involving 
participation 
Ethnic war 
present 
7 4 3 50% 
Ethnic war not 
present 
4 1 2 43% 
 
                                                          
17 For ease of analysis, the category ‘no evidence of participation/mobilisation’ has been merged with ‘evidence 
of no participation/mobilisation’ from this hypothesis forward. 
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There is no clear correlation between ethnic war and participation, and the hypothesis that 
ethnic cleansing geno-politicides will involve civilian participation is therefore rejected. The 
distribution of the consistent cases in particular, with the truly systemic cases of Indonesia 
and China lacking any ethnic aspect, draws the hypothesis into question.  
 Table 7 – Types of killing and civilian participation  
 No part. Inconsistent 
part. 
Consistent 
part. 
Genocide 0 1 2 
Politicide 3 1 1 
Politicide with communal victims 4 2 1 
Genocide and politicide  4 1 1 
 
H4, the hypothesis that politicides will not involve civilian participation, is also rejected. The 
instances of participation are relatively evenly spread across each category of killing, and it is 
clear that in Indonesia and China, as in other politicides, civilians were willing to participate.  
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Figure 1 – Duration of killing and civilian mobilisation 
 
The scatterplot above displays the duration of killing in months on the Y-axis, with the line at 
90.6 indicting the mean duration of all 21 cases. The cases with no civilian participation are 
distributed fairly consistently, with 41% below the average and 59% above it, whereas 71% 
of the consistent cases – Bosnia, both instances in Burundi, Indonesia 1965-66, and Rwanda 
– are well below the average. H5 is therefore accepted, as geno-politicides with civilian 
participation are on average shorter than those without. However, the fact that there are five 
cases without participation that are also below average is a clear indication that other factors 
are necessary to explain this correlation.   
The hypothesis that geno-politicides in countries where PGMs are present will involve 
civilian mobilisation could not be adequately tested, given that data on PGMs was only 
available for geno-politicides post 1981. This reduced the number of cases for which the 
hypothesis could be tested to eleven. Of these cases all except one saw the presence of PGMs, 
and of these only three also had civilian mobilisation. These results therefore tell us little 
about any possible links between PGMs and mobilisation. Indeed, PGMs are a near constant 
s1342487 
35 
 
factor in states suffering geno-politicide, meaning they are unlikely to be able to predict 
mobilisation without further research on the interplay between PGMs and armed civilians.  
Table 8 – Party-based regimes and political participation18 
 No pol. part. Inconsistent pol. 
part 
Consistent pol. 
part. 
Cases 
involving 
participation 
Party-based 
regime 
7 0 3 30% 
Non- party-
based regime 
11 1 3 26% 
 
H7 was only able to be tested once the regime type variable was simplified, due to the wide 
range of autocratic regimes that commit genocide. Eight types of regime were found in the 
instances of genocide analysed, all of them autocratic. These were various combinations of 
three base types found in Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s database (2014): party, personal and 
military regimes. When separating these into two categories – at least partially party-based 
regimes and those fully military and/or personal – there are no significant differences in 
political participation between the two types of regime. H6 is therefore rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The total number of regimes is 25 due to regime changes within country during certain instances of genocide. 
These regime changes cannot be tied to (immediate) changes in the intensity of the genocide or 
mobilisation/participation. Burundi in 1993 was left out of the coding for this hypothesis, as the dataset used had 
no data on the country between 1993 and 1996. The majority of the killing took place during the power vacuum 
in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of the President (ICIB 2002).  
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Figure 2 – Average monthly death toll and civilian participation (log. scale) 
 
The hypothesis that civilian participation will lead to a greater average death toll is also 
rejected, given the lack of clear patterns in the scatterplot above. Here the monthly average 
death toll has been calculated based on taking the midpoint of the range of estimated deaths 
for each instance in Harff (2003). A logarithmic scale is used above to best display the wide 
variation in monthly death tolls. The line across the graph at 5296 is the median (China 1966-
75), chosen instead of the mean to avoid distortion from the extreme values of Rwanda and 
Pakistan. While all the cases with a score of 1 for civilian participation, except China, are 
above the median, the majority of the cases scoring 0.5 are below average. Without further 
research, it is impossible to make a causal link between civilian participation and the average 
monthly death toll.   
Discussion 
This section will begin by discussing the answer to the question of whether civilians take part 
in geno-politicide. It will then cover rejected hypotheses for the conditions in which such 
participation may take place, followed by those conditions that may be connected to 
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participation. Finally, potential directions for future research based on the results will be 
outlined. 
Do civilians take part in geno-politicide?  
The answer to this central question is a nuanced one. Firstly, the data on civilian participation 
immediately highlights that theories of mass killing focused solely on the strategic calculus of 
a small group within the state must account for the cases in which civilian participation was 
essential to the manner in which the killing took place. The hypothesis that civilians “almost 
never take part” is clearly rejected. The cases of inconsistent civilian participation could 
potentially be explained by proponents of the strategic view as the work of quasi-civilian 
death squads or more commonplace ethnic riots, though I believe such a view would 
oversimplify the results. However, the five cases of consistent participation must be 
accounted for, and cannot be dismissed as exceptions. The deaths of up to three million 
people in these five geno-politicides are hard to reconcile with a view of mass killing as 
“bloody work [carried out with] little more than the passive acceptance of the rest of society” 
(Valentino 2005, 3). 
At the same time, however, theories of mass killing that focus on structural causes must 
account for the fact that in the majority of cases of geno-politicide the security forces are the 
sole actors responsible for the killing itself. Gerlach’s statement that “a perception of social 
crisis also helps to explain why the use of violence is so often not just a matter of the state” 
(2010, 12) may be correct when it comes to passively accepting the use of violence, but not 
when it comes to committing it. Even in situations where genocide is taking place in a 
country where ethnic divisions have been exacerbated to the point of actual ethnic warfare, 
civilians fail to take any part in the killing in half of these instances. The strategic view that 
mass killing is the work of a relatively small group of people is in the majority of cases 
correct. 
Rejected explanations 
Another conclusion the results make clear that there are no simple explanations for why we 
see mobilisation and participation in a few instances and none in others. A number of these 
failed explanations are worth highlighting here. Firstly, the link between ethnic divides and 
mass killing must be severely questioned. The results show no indication that mass killing of 
ethnically defined victim groups are more likely than other forms of killing to involve civilian 
participation. People are evidently just as able to kill a member of the political ‘other’, as the 
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mass participation in killing of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ or communists in China and 
Indonesia demonstrates. Politicides within ethnic groups are equally as likely to see 
participation as politicides in which the victims also have a different ethnic identity to their 
killers. In line with Mueller’s research (2000), ‘ethnic warfare’, or ethnic killing by civilians 
in this case, is not greatly different than non-ethnic killing. 
Secondly, there are few links between types of regime or state and participation or 
mobilisation. As the results show, both party-based regimes and non-party-based regimes 
have closely similar chances of seeing political participation. In addition, a diverse range of 
autocratic regimes have carried out geno-politicide and have mobilised civilians. While not 
tested for given the limited number of communist states in the dataset, of the four communist 
states that carried out geno-politicide, one saw civilian mobilisation and participation, and 
three did not – in line with the overall results. While it could be suggested that military 
regimes would also be unlikely to mobilise civilians, preferring to rely on their own power 
base in the military, we do see any patterns here either. (Semi-)military regimes in five 
countries mobilised civilians to some degree, and in Indonesia the military played the key 
role in mobilising and inciting civilian violence.19 These results could be interpreted as 
supporting a focus on the incentives faced by the regime carrying out the killing, rather than 
the nature of the regime itself.  
Finally, the nature of the link between participation and average death toll is unclear due to 
the highly different results we see for inconsistent and consistent participation. While none of 
the consistent cases have below average death rates, four of the five inconsistent cases are 
either approximately average or below average. A potential explanation may be linked to the 
duration of the killing. The three inconsistent cases with below average death toll (Sudan 
1983-2002, Guatemala and El Salvador) all also have above average duration, whereas the 
four consistent cases that are above average also have a shorter than average duration. It may 
therefore be the case that the different nature of the killings in Sudan, Guatemala and El 
Salvador, taking place over a long period, led to a different kind of participation that did not 
raise the average killing rate, whereas in the shorter geno-politicides civilian participation had 
the predicted force multiplier effect.  
                                                          
19 While Indonesia is coded according to the dataset used as a personal regime, the army was the state actor most 
responsible for planning and carrying out the killing, and indeed the campaign eventually led to the overthrow 
of Sukarno’s personalist regime (Robinson 2018, 6).  
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Accepted hypotheses 
Two hypotheses, however, were at least partially confirmed: an extremely high correlation 
between civilian mobilisation and participation and a correlation between civilian 
participation and shorter duration of killing. These are discussed here in reverse order. 
The first confirmed hypothesis is the connection between duration and civilian participation. 
The cases in which we see civilian participation are distributed in a non-average manner, with 
five of the seven consistent cases taking place in a significantly shorter than average period. 
Two interpretations of this are possible. The first and most simple interpretation is that 
mobilisation occurred for reasons unconnected to duration, and due to the force multiplier 
effect finished the killing more quickly. The second, which connects mobilisation directly to 
duration, is that mobilisation takes place when the elite perpetrators feel under urgent threat, 
and seek a force multiplier to neutralise the threat as quickly as possible. Such urgent threats 
could from outside the regime, in the form of attempted coups or the beginning of civil war  
(Wayman and Tago 2010, 9; Goldsmith et al. 2013), or even threats from elites within the 
regime (Van der Maat 2015). This would be supported by the examples of Rwanda, Indonesia 
1965-66 and Burundi 1972-73 in particular, as the killing began immediately following the 
assassination of regime elites in the first two cases, and after an ethnic rebellion in the third 
(Desforges 1999; Robinson 2018; René Lemarchand 2009).20 A similar pattern may have 
taken place in Burundi in 1993, where the killing began after the assassination of the Hutu 
president by Tutsi soldiers. Given the legacy of the previous genocide in 1972-73 members of 
the president’s party must have seen this as a threat (Lynch 2013), which may explain their 
role in mobilising killing.  
However, while a clear correlation, as an explanation for mobilisation this interpretation of 
acute threat is insufficient. There are other cases in which the duration was below average, 
but less or no mobilisation took place. A particularly relevant counter-example is that of 
Pakistan. There too the victory of the Awami League in national elections posed an 
immediate threat to the unity of the country and the power of elites (Jahan 2009) – yet the 
army seemingly had little need for a force multiplier, only mobilising support from political 
parties on an inconsistent basis. The relative strength of the Pakistani army alone is not 
                                                          
20 The argument can be made that the genocide in Rwanda was only of short duration due to external factors, 
namely the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in the civil war. However, given that approximately three 
quarters of the Rwandan Tutsis were killed in just three months (Desforges 1999, 18), it seems unlikely that the 
killing would have lasted for much longer, and clear that speed was an aim. 
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enough to explain this difference, given that Indonesia also had a powerful and modern army 
when they decided to mobilise their population (Robinson 2018, 45-46). Further research will 
be needed to consider additional factors that may be necessary for explaining this correlation.  
The other confirmed hypothesis, with more far-reaching implications, is the link between 
mobilisation and participation. We see only two cases in which consistent mobilisation 
achieves inconsistent participation, Bosnia and Guatemala, and one case of apparently 
spontaneous participation in Sudan 1956-72.21 In all other cases there is exact correspondence 
between the degree of mobilisation and participation. This suggests that the most necessary 
condition for civilian participation to take place is mobilisation by the government. Again, 
however, two interpretations are possible. The first is that if the government carries out a 
mobilisation campaign, this campaign will always have a reasonable degree of success in 
bringing about participation. An alternative explanation for the connection reverses causation 
and suggests that if conditions are present that would make civilian participation possible – if 
people are already willing to kill – the government will take the opportunity to mobilise them. 
On the basis of this research, the first explanation appears more likely, given the substantial 
effort that governments have made to mobilise their population, and the degree of low-level 
coercion that was necessary.   
In all the consistent cases, with the exception of Burundi 1993, which is discussed below, 
mobilisation was a far-reaching effort by the government to put immense pressure on the 
population to participate, or at least tolerate public killing. We do not see the government 
merely giving permission for certain groups to use violence, or simply encouraging killing 
from the sidelines. Instead the government uses the language of duty or national emergency 
to convey the urgency and necessity of killing, as happened in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996, 
98). In addition, the security forces or pro-government militias almost always take a leading 
role, starting off the killing, and pushing other to join. In Rwanda, for example, the 
Interahamwe are described as forming the core of ‘killer groups’ of civilians (Smeulers and 
Hoex 2010, 442). Finally, the state can provide the logistical support that civilian killers lack, 
leading to a close and self-reinforcing cooperation (Robinson 2018). State violence and 
                                                          
21 In Bosnia there were consistently material incentives to participate, but only inconsistent participation – 
potentially because material benefits could also be gained without participation through the general 
redistribution of territory. The Guatemalan government mobilised voluntary death squads, but also created 
civilian militias through extreme coercion, which were not coded as participation. In Sudan civilians in the south 
appear to have occasionally killed or raped, seemingly for their own gain, but there was no evidence of a 
government policy of using civilians. Further detail on these instances can be found in the corresponding coding 
entries in Appendix B. 
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civilian violence exist side by side, rather than the government merely allowing civilians to 
do its work for it.  
Another important point to note is the degree of coercion that is present in these cases, 
indicating that people are rarely eager participants in killing. While forced participation or 
violent coercion was not coded as participation, peer pressure and the fear of being ostracised 
or losing status within the community should not be considered as inescapable coercion, 
given the extreme nature of the acts being committed.22 What we see in these cases is that 
people are drawn into participating in acts they would not have carried out in a different 
environment. Certain perpetrators in Rwanda, for example, present themselves as having had 
killed because “killing was “the law”” (Straus 2006, 137). During the Cultural Revolution, 
students desperately seeking membership in the Red Guards killed and tortured to achieve 
status in a suddenly changed society (Gong 2003, 123). This is the same disturbing 
conclusion that we see in Browning’s Ordinary Men (2001) – that most people fear the 
judgement of their peers more than killing a fellow human being. This suggests that while 
most civilian perpetrators were not eager to participate, they were also unwilling to go to 
great efforts to escape having to kill.   
These details therefore are not consistent with the theory that civilians are willing to 
participate and are therefore easy targets for opportunist mobilisation by the state. Instead, 
this points to a large-scale campaign by the government making great efforts to involve 
civilians and civilian organisations in the killing. Given the consistency between the factors 
of mobilisation and participation, these campaigns appear to be highly successful. The 
implications of this are in line with Milgram or Browning’s research. Human beings are 
relatively easily pressured into committing acts of violence, even individuals who have not 
been trained or form part of a cohesive unit. However, it is necessary to provide some nuance 
to this connection through the examples of spontaneous participation in Burundi 1993 and the 
Cultural Revolution in China. The first is an indication that mobilisation may not always be a 
necessary element, and the second highlights the complexity of untangling the two factors. 
In Burundi the only form of mobilisation coded as present was material incentives, setting it 
apart from the other four consistent cases. This may be largely due to the fact that the 
majority of killing took place during a power vacuum lasting three days in the wake of the 
                                                          
22 Straus differentiates between the motivation of coercion, implying the possibility for direct harm, and that 
obedience, implying the possibility that not participating may be wrong in some manner (2006, 136).  
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assassination of the president (ICIB 2002). These three days saw Hutu civilian attacks on 
Tutsis that were often instigated by (civilian) functionaries of the FRODEBU political party 
rather than the government (2002). However, there are also patterns of spontaneous violence 
(ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013), which Lynch connects to lessons communities drew from local 
events during the 1972-73 genocide. Hutus who had experienced devastating violence in 
1972-73 were afraid to attack Tutsis in 1993 in revenge for the assassination of the Hutu 
president – whereas civilians with other experiences carried out attacks without being 
mobilised (Lynch 2013). Bundervoet’s research into the killing has also shown that wealthier 
Tutsis were more likely to be targeted, and that the killing was greater in parts of the country 
where land pressure – a serious problem in Burundi – was greatest (Bundervoet 2009). While 
his research also suggests an organising role played by FRODEBU, the example of Burundi 
indicates that in certain circumstances government campaigns may be less necessary to spark 
civilian participation.  
The Cultural Revolution offers a similar cautionary example, with a complex interplay 
between government mobilisation and spontaneous organisation. A significant proportion of 
the violence at the beginning of the Revolution was carried out by the Red Guards, student 
groups backed by the state (Gong 2003, 114). Their origins appear to be largely spontaneous. 
The first Guard groups were formed in secret, but once they approached the government and 
were praised by Mao Zedong as part of his effort to neutralise his political enemies, the 
groups spread explosively across the country (Wang 2003, 35-36). The campaign of violence 
they then began against those seen as enemies of the revolution went far beyond what Mao 
had imagined, but was embraced so as not to “dampen the enthusiasm of the Red Guards” 
(37). By 1967 China had essentially entered civil war between various factions of 
revolutionaries and the army, each side convinced they were supported by Mao (Dikotter 
2016, 145). This example demonstrates both the tendency for violence to grow beyond what 
its instigators had imagined, as well as the self-reinforcing tendencies of mobilisation and 
participation together. While the results of this thesis indicate that mobilisation is almost 
always followed by participation, the causal direction must be treated with caution. 
While both the accepted and rejected hypotheses are only a small number of potential 
explanations for the results, the lack of simple explanations for this phenomenon becomes 
most clear when we focus on the five cases of consistent participation: China, Indonesia, 
Rwanda and Burundi 1972-73 and 1993. The three African cases share similarities, revolving 
around the allocation of political power between ethnic groups. However, the cases in China 
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and Indonesia could not be more different. With the exception of some attacks on ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia,23 these instances took place entirely within ethnic groups. Neither 
country was at war at the time, and China even lacked a violent trigger for the killing, 
compared to the assassination of a number of generals by communists in Indonesia (Cribb 
2009). Finally, the Indonesian killings were to some degree unique in the degree to which 
civil society organisations were among the instigators of the killing rather than merely joining 
it, with religious groups and political parties eagerly allying with the army to destroy the 
communists (Robinson 2018, 171-176). Yet these five different cases share a pattern of 
consistent civilian participation unique among the 21 cases covered in this thesis.  
It is clear that future work to further understand the nature of civilian participation in geno-
politicide should focus on these five cases to examine why we see these patterns here and not 
elsewhere. The results of this thesis can provide some suggestions on how to pursue this 
explanation. The two confirmed hypotheses suggest that mobilisation is the key factor. 
Firstly, the fact that mobilisation is almost always accompanied by a corresponding degree of 
participation points in the direction of a focus on elite decision-making. In addition, the 
shorter duration of episodes involving mobilisation may point towards a link between 
urgency on the part of elites and the desire for a force multiplier effect.  Comparative 
research focused on this area can draw together insight from each instance on the incentives 
and constraints faced by the planners of the genocide. This research must also examine 
similar instances where participation did not take place and establish differences in the 
conditions faced by those carrying out the killing. 
However, it is important to also take into account local factors and avoid a ‘one size fits all’ 
explanation. With a relatively small population of cases of geno-politicide, these factors can 
have a large impact on the overall pattern. A great deal of research has already been done in 
this area. Straus, for example, argues that a history of conscription for labour, among other 
factors, may explain the mobilisation of the Rwandan population for killing (2006, 202). 
Robinson discusses an Indonesian history of mobilising civilian militias (2018, 25), and the 
impact of land pressure in Burundi has already been mentioned above. These factors are 
clearly important, and as mentioned in the introduction, there is a wealth of research on each 
individual case of geno-politicide that can be drawn upon. At the same time, it would be a 
mistake to examine each case in isolation and attempt to explain the same phenomenon in 
                                                          
23 The notion that the killing was particularly or disproportionately focused on Chinese has been shown to be a 
persistent myth (Cribb and Coppel 2009).  
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different ways in each case. Identifying common factors and patterns will allow for better 
understanding of geno-politicide, and potentially even how to prevent it.  
Conclusion 
As outlined above in the discussion, a great deal of research must be done in this field to 
better understand civilian participation in geno-politicide and the variance in its appearance 
throughout the 20th century. However, the findings of this thesis are already a contribution to 
this field. Firstly, the research has been able to create a broad overview of civilian 
mobilisation and participation across cases, allowing for comparisons to be made and 
providing clear data on this phenomenon. Secondly, it has shown that while the majority of 
geno-politicides are carried out by the security forces alone, almost 50% see some degree of 
civilian participation, and ≈25% involve consistent civilian participation. Finally, two 
significant connections were found in the study between the conditions in which geno-
politicide took place and the degree of participation. Firstly, instances involving consistent 
civilian participation are on average shorter than those that do not. Secondly, civilian 
mobilisation by the government is almost always followed by a corresponding degree of 
participation. No other highly significant results were found, demonstrating that factors such 
as ethnicity or regime type do not play a role in participation. 
This thesis of course has its limitations, mainly due to its limited scope and the depth of 
research required. Firstly, the thesis relied on secondary sources due to the impossibility of 
extensive research on 21 cases. While in certain cases primary sources such as truth 
commission reports were available, in many instances the coding relied on secondary 
research. This necessarily affects the depth of research, as archival research would be able to 
better establish government decision making and the degree to which civilians participated.24 
Similarly, the research relied on proxy variables from data sets gathered by others. Again, 
within the scope of this thesis it was necessary to accept variables such as PITF’s ethnic or 
revolutionary war, rather than carrying in depth research to determine whether a particular 
genocide was motivated by ethnic cleansing or counterinsurgency. In the worst case, this may 
have led to coding that incorrectly reflects the reality of the geno-politicide. However, to 
ensure consistency, it was necessary to adhere to the data sets, rather than creating a large 
number of exceptions requiring explanation. This also makes the data gathered more suitable 
for future use.   
                                                          
24 See Gerlach (2010, 9-11) for a discussion of similar limitations in his work. 
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Another potential limitation is the focus on a subset of 21 out of 37 cases. As mentioned 
above, due to scarce literature and limited scope, all cases with less than 50 000 victims were 
ruled out. It is difficult to state what impact this may have had on the results, and it is 
possible that geno-politicides smaller in scale have different dynamics. However, the focus 
on the 21 worst instances of geno-politicide does mean that the results are still significant in 
attempting to understand the phenomenon, given that they account for approximately 98% of 
the total death toll of geno-politicides between 1955-2002.25 
Finally, while directions for future research on the issue of civilian participation have already 
been outlined in the section above, there are a number of theoretical conclusions that can be 
drawn which are relevant for the wider field. Firstly, the fact that some geno-politicides rely 
solely on the security forces, while others involve varying degrees of popular participation, 
presents a challenge to both theories of mass killing focusing on strategic incentives and 
theories examining societal factors. Clearly geno-politicide can be both carried out with very 
little involvement from society as whole, or become an upheaval that takes over all aspects of 
national life, which has consequences for the way we think of its causes. More research is 
needed to better understand how the level of civilian participation is connected to the causes 
of geno-politicide. Secondly, the fact that government campaigns of mobilisation almost 
always result in success provides further evidence for theories of mass violence that 
emphasise the susceptibility of individuals to peer pressure, and advances these theories by 
focusing on civilians rather than individuals in military units. While civilians were eager to 
participate only in rare instances, a significant number were willing to commit acts of 
horrendous violence when placed under pressure or given the opportunity to profit. This 
further complicates the issue of responsibility for mass killing, and presents complex 
questions in an era of increasing legal accountability for perpetrators of genocide. Future 
research in the field of civilian participation in geno-politicide to build on the work this thesis 
has done is therefore highly relevant to the wider field. 
  
                                                          
25 Calculated using midpoint of the range of estimated deaths for each instance in Harff (2003). 
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Appendix A – Codebook  
Country 
Enter country name from PITF set 
Time period of killing  
Enter time period from PITF set 
Duration of killing  
Enter duration of killing in months 
Average severity of geno-politicide  
Enter average DEATHMAG score across years from PITF set.  
Peak severity of geno-politicide  
Enter peak DEATHMAG score from PITF set 
Type of killing 
Use Table 1 in Harff 2003: 
0: Genocide 
1: Politicide 
2: Politicide with communal victims 
3: Both (genocide & politicide) 
Regime type 
Use Geddes, Wright and Frantz dataset (2014). Enter regime type in words. If multiple 
regimes, enter all regimes with years in brackets.  
Communist state 
Use secondary literature: 
0: No communist state  
1: Communist state 
Revolutionary war 
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Use PITF set: 
0: No revolutionary war in the country when the geno-politicide began 
1: Presence of a revolutionary war when the geno-politicide began 
Ethnic war 
Use PITF set: 
0: No ethnic war in the country during the geno-politicide 
1: Presence of ethnic war in the country during the geno-politicide 
Pro-government militias (PGMs) 
Use PGMD: 
0: No PGMs (for geno-politicides after 1981) 
1: Presence of at least one PGM (for geno-politicides after 1981) 
N/A: Geno-politicides before 1981  
Civilian mobilisation  
For this section use the following criteria for the type of civilian mobilisation in each 
question. The full definitions are provided in the definitions section of the thesis. 
Question 1 – government call  
• Concrete and explicit call by the government or its agents for civilians to participate26  
• Can take the form of public statements for a broad audience that participation is 
encouraged, expected, or a duty 
• Can take the form of the government or its agents asking or encouraging other 
organisations or individuals directly to participate – either privately or in public. 
• Euphemisms broadly understood by the population as referring to killing – and 
explained as such in secondary literature – should be coded positively 
• If individuals are coerced into participation – by any means – this should be coded 
positively. 
Question 2 – Societal/peer pressure 
                                                          
26 Participation in geno-politicide – or ‘participation in killing’ – here refers to active participation. Besides 
killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in killing, knowingly 
providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 
37), as well as rape, torture, or severe physical harm. 
s1342487 
53 
 
• Pressure on individual from society as a whole or individuals in the community to 
participate in the geno-politicide 
• Not pressure from other individuals within a constituted unit or organisation 
• Can take the form of a society wide cessation of ordinary life in which killing comes 
to dominate society and is even seen as a duty27  
• Can take the form of civilians pressuring other civilians to join the killing 
Question 3 – Material incentives 
• Civilians are able to profit directly through participation in the geno-politicide 
through material gains 
• This can take the form of looting or stealing land, property, or goods from victims  
• It can also take the form of direct material rewards by the government for 
participation 
• The connection between participation and reward must be direct 
Code each question according to the following:  
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)28 
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents) 
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space. 
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space. 
Civilian mobilisation score 
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents) 
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)  
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space  
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space 
In the sources section, fill in Yes/No/No evidence with the source and page number.  
Question Code Sources 
                                                          
27 Compare examples of Rwanda (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445) or Burundi (Lemarchand 2009, 272) 
28 Isolated incidents are instances of killing large enough to be reported in the literature, but that are not part of a 
pattern even over a short period of time, and which are limited to less than 5 throughout the geno-politicide. 
Compare the example of Angola, where only one significant incident of ad hoc violence took place (Heywood 
2011, 322). 
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1. Did the government or 
government actors call on 
civilians to join the killing?  
  
2. Was there societal/peer 
pressure on civilians to 
participate?  
  
3. Were there material 
incentives for civilians to 
actively participate? 
  
Civilian mobilisation    
 
Civilian participation 
For this section use the following criteria for the type of civilian participation in each 
question. The full definitions are provided in the definitions section of the thesis. 
Question 1 – Genocidal civilian militias:  
• Not part of the regular security forces, and membership not drawn from the military, 
security forces, or law enforcement 
• Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party 
• Armed 
• Has some level of organisation 
• Participating in killing of members of the defined target group29 
• Created at the start of the genocide or once it began 
• Created with the most important aim being to carry out geno-politicide 
• The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced30 
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Question 2 – Civil society organisations:  
                                                          
29 See footnote 1 
30 While all coercion is coded as civilian mobilisation, it is coded differently for participation. Pressure to 
participate of the sort commonly referred to in the literature, such as peer pressure or losing respect in the 
community (Browning 1998) will be coded as participation. However, if individuals are forced to take part in 
the face of serious consequences such as imprisonment, torture, or death (e.g. Guatemala (Jonas 2009, 319)), 
this will not be coded as participation, given that such it describes less the overall conditions of the genocide and 
more the immediate threat.  
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• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group 
• Created either before or during the geno-politicide  
• Meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian  
• Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party 
• Must have other societal roles and reasons for existence besides killing 
• The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced 
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Question 3 – Ad hoc killing:  
• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group 
• No defined membership or organisational structure 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
• In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.  
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
Or 
• Individual carrying out killing 
• Individual must meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
According to research, code Question 1, 2 and 3 as follows: 
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents) 
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)31 
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space32  
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space33 
Civilian participation score 
99: At least 1 question coded as no evidence, and all others coded as 0 
0: All questions coded as 0 
0.5: At least one question coded as 0.5, and none coded as 1 
1: At least one question coded as 1 
                                                          
31 Compare to model example of the Anfal Campaign in Iraq  
32 Compare to model example of Guatemala  
33 Compare to model example of the Rwandan Genocide 
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In the sources section, fill in Yes/No/No evidence with the source and page number.  
Question Code Sources 
1. Did genocidal civilian 
militias participate in the 
killing? 
  
2. Did civil society 
organisations participate in 
the killing? 
  
3. Did civilians participate 
in the killing on an ad hoc 
basis? 
  
Civilian participation   
 
Political participation 
For this question use the following criteria for political participation. The full definition is 
provided in the definitions section of the thesis. 
• Organisation meets Sartori’s definition of a political party 
• Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group  
• Carrying out this killing as an organisation, rather than on an individual basis  
• Created either before or during the geno-politicide 
• Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian 
• Members carrying out killing do not have a role in the government 
• Can be carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members 
According to research, code political participation as follows: 
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents) 
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)34 
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space  
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space35 
Question Code Sources 
                                                          
34 Compare to model example of the Anfal Campaign in Iraq  
35 Compare to model example of Uganda 1980-86 
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1. Did political parties 
participate in the killing? 
  
 
Notes 
Provide further detail on any coding that could be contested or that requires further 
explanation, or aspects of the killing that arose during the coding and require further 
examination. 
Sources 
Provide a full bibliography of sources used  
  
s1342487 
58 
 
Appendix B – Individual geno-politicide coding 
Country Sudan 
Time period of 
killing 
1956-1972 
Duration of 
killing 
186 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
2.8 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Military (58-64) Personal (69-85) 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974 Yes: Saeed 220-227, 231-232; Poggo 341-345 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1999 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974 Yes: Saeed 220-227; Poggo 341-345 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1999 
Notes Due to the vagueness and relative lack of comprehensive sources, it is 
difficult to code this instance of geno-politicide. Without further 
information, it is difficult to tell whether the atrocities committed by 
tribes discussed by Saeed (220-232) should be coded as civilian violence, 
or whether these were more closely connected to the government. 
However, given the incidents discussed by Saeed, similar references 
made by Poggo to traders raping women (341) and merchants described 
as the “emissaries of [the] government” picking out “ring leaders”,  (344-
345), as well as the emphasis placed by all sources, especially Eprile, on 
killing committed by soldiers, it seems likely that 0.5 is the most 
appropriate code for Civ. Part. Q1 and Q3. While the vast majority of the 
killing may have been carried out by soldiers, it seems likely that there 
was occasional civilian participation. 
Sources Eprile, Cecil. 1974. War and Peace in the Sudan: 1955-1972. London: 
David & Charles.   
 
Poggo, Scopas Sekwat. 1999. “War and Conflict in the Southern Sudan, 
1955–1972.” Ph.D., United States -- California: University of California, 
Santa Barbara.  
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Saeed, Abdalbasit. 1982. “The State and Socioeconomic Transformation 
in the Sudan: The Case of Social Conflict in Southwest Kurdufan.” 
Ph.D., United States -- Connecticut: University of Connecticut.  
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Country China 
Time period of 
killing 
1959 
Duration of 
killing 
10 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
4 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
4 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Party-based 
Communist 
state  
1 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013 
Notes It is somewhat difficult to ascertain which events exactly the dataset focuses 
on. The description in the PITF dataset is: "Army and security forces 
suppress counter-revolutionary elements of society, including Tibetan 
Buddhists, landowners, and supporters of former Chiang Kai-shek regime.". 
However, Harff refers specifically to a geno-politicide in Tibet (2003, 72). 
It also proved impossible to find sources discussing what could be 
considered as a geno-politicide over this limited time frame outside Tibet, 
given that China was in the middle of the Great Leap Forward, involving 
tens of millions of deaths which in this dataset are not considered to be 
geno-politicide. Therefore, the focus has been on events in Tibet.  
 
The only actor referred to as carrying out killing in any of the sources is the 
PLA. All forms of civilian participation have therefore been coded as 99. 
Sources Chen, Jian. 2006. “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing 
Relations with India and the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies 8 
(3): 54–101.   
 
Norbu, Dawa. 1979. “The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation.” The 
China Quarterly, no. 77: 74–93.   
 
Schaik, Sam van. 2013. Tibet: A History. New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press.   
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Shakabpa, W.D., and D.F. Maher. 2009. One Hundred Thousand Moons: 
An Advanced Political History of Tibet. Leiden: Brill. 
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Country South Vietnam 
Time period of 
killing 
1965-1975 
Duration of 
killing 
123 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  1 
Regime type Military 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
1 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  
 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993 
Notes None of the sources consulted demonstrate any evidence that civilians were 
involved in the killing. The deaths of civilians are attributed to massacres 
by the military, failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and 
disregard for civilian life during bombardment. 
Sources Greiner, Bernd. 2010. War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam. London: 
Vintage. 
 
Turse, Nick. 2013. Kill Anything That Moves. New York: Picador. 
 
Lewy, Guenter. 1980. America in Vietnam. A Galaxy Book. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Sleezer, Karen. 1993. “Atrocities and War Crimes.” In The Vietnam War: 
Handbook of the Literature and Research, edited by James S. Olson, 171–
92. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
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Country Indonesia 
Time period of 
killing 
1965-1966 
Duration of 
killing 
10 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
4.8 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
5 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
s1342487 
70 
 
Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
Yes: Robinson 2018; Cribb 2009 N.E: McGregor 2009; Cribb 1990; Young 
1990 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
Yes: Robinson 2018; Young 1990. N.E: McGregor 2009; Cribb 1990; Cribb 
2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
1 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
Yes: Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Cribb 2009 N.E: McGregor 2009; Young 
1990 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
Yes: Young 1990; Robinson 2018. N.E: McGregor 2009;  Cribb 1990; Cribb 
2009 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009 
Notes The Nahdlatul Ulama and its youth movement Ansor were highly involved 
in the killing, as described in all sources. Given that the group was both a 
political party and a religious organisation with activities outside of politics, 
it has been coded as both CSO and political participation. 
 
The sources are not entirely in agreement on to what extent the military is to 
blame for the killings, with Robinson assigning a higher level of 
responsibility to the military and arguing that little killing took place without 
their encouragement or permission (2018). Other (older) sources allow more 
room for spontaneous action. However, whatever the role of the army, it is 
clear that there was significant participation by civilians who came together 
in vigilante groups or existing political/social groups to kill.  
 
  
Sources Cribb, Robert. 1990. “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in 
Indonesia.” In The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, edited by Robert Cribb, 
1–44. Clayton: Monash University.   
 
———. 2009. “The Indonesian Massacres.” In Century of Genocide: 
Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and 
William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 193–217. New York: Routledge.   
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McGregor, Katharine. 2009. “The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966.” 
Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. August 
2009. http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/indonesian-killings-1965-1966.    
 
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2018. The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian 
Massacres, 1965-66. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
 
Young, Kenneth R. 1990. “Local and National Influences in the Violence of 
1965.” In The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, edited by Robert Cribb, 63–
100. Clayton: Monash University. 
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Country China 
Time period of 
killing 
1966-1975 
Duration of 
killing 
118 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  1 
Regime type Party-based 
Communist 
state  
1 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-6, Gong 2003 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
Yes: Dikotter ch. 7-8; Gong 2003;  
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
1 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Dikotter ch. 6-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-6; Gong 2003 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: Dikotter 2016; Gong 2003. N.E. Wang 2003 
Notes In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, violence spread from student 
groups who became increasingly violent in attacking class enemies, 
encouraged to some degree by the government (Dikotter 60-63). The Red 
Guards began as such a non-governmentally organised militia which 
spontaneously and autonomously organised (Gong 120), in secret at first 
(Wang 35), before spreading across the country. It eventually became 
strongly supported by the government, which officially recognised them and 
organised mass rallies (Wang 36) – however, they remained a movement 
outside of clear command and control (Dikotter 2016). By 1967 their 
violence grew beyond even what the government had imagined, and the 
army was tasked with bringing them under control (130-131). This then led 
to violence between the Red Guards and the army until late 1968, when the 
Red Guards were essentially abolished (177-179). Violence after this point 
was largely carried out by the state. Despite this complex role the 
government played, question 1 of civilian participation has been coded in the 
affirmative. It is clear that the Red Guards were a means by which civilians 
came together to attack perceived class enemies.    
 
While some party members and cadres were the target of attacks in the 
confusing ideological warfare that went along with the conflict (Gong 2003, 
115), party members were also involved in the killing, with certain factions 
promoting and supporting the Red Guards (Dikotter 2016). Other cadres 
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supported attacks on those considered to be part of the opposing factions 
(Gong 2003, 125) Party 'work-teams' were also involved, especially at the 
beginning of the violence (Dikotter 2016). 
Sources Dikotter, Frank. 2016. The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962—
1976. E-book Edition. Bloomsbury Publishing.  
 
Gong, Xiaoxia. 2003. “The Logic of Repressive Collective Action: A Case 
Study of Violence in the Cultural Revolution.” In The Chinese Cultural 
Revolution Reconsidered, edited by Kam-yee Law, 113–32. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Wang, Shaoguang. 2003. “Between Destruction and Construction: The First 
Year of the Cultural Revolution.” In The Chinese Cultural Revolution 
Reconsidered, edited by Kam-yee Law, 25–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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Country Pakistan 
Time period of 
killing 
1971 
Duration of 
killing 
10 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
5 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Military-personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
0.5 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
Yes: Jahan 2009; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972. N.E.:  Bass 2013;  Rummel 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
Yes: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013. N.E. Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009 
Political 
participation 
0.5 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: Jahan 2009; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972 N.E. Bass 2013; Rummel 2009 
Notes References are made in different sources to rioting and ad hoc attacks on 
Bengali civilians by the Muslim minority of Bangladesh (Bass 2013, chapter 
4, 5; Jahan 2009, 252). However, no sources contains detailed information 
on these incidents, merely alleging that they took place, making it difficult to 
determine how extensive these were. Detailed accounts are made of the role 
played by the Pakistan military, which used tanks and bombers to attack 
civilians (Bass, chapter 4, 5; Jahan, 259.) Bass also states that US diplomats 
on the ground "saw the civil war as primarily the result of Yahya's assault on 
the Bengali population, not as an inchoate spasm of violence in which all 
sides were matched in bloodshed" (chapter 5). Given the overwhelmingly 
dominant role played by the military, ad hoc violence has been coded as 0.5. 
 
Mention is made by a number of authors of the armed groups Al Badr and 
Al Shams and "armed volunteers" called Razakars. Jahan refers to the 
former two as "armed vigilante groups" (251), though they appear to have 
been drawn from Muslim political parties (Ahmed 1996, 101; ICJ 1972, 44-
45). It is difficult to exactly classify these groups. With regards to the 
Razakars, in Gates & Roy's "Unconventional Warfare in South East Asia", 
they describe these groups as being created by the government as a 
paramilitary force, and led by specially chosen army officers (2014, 117). 
They were trained by the army, and had other duties besides killing. Ahmed 
also mentions that official Pakistani Army regulations gave officers the same 
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authority over the Razakars as Pakistani soldiers (112). The Razakars have 
therefore not been coded as civilian participation. However, the al-Badr 
group (Al Shams is not referred to in other texts) appears to have operated as 
a death squad wing of the Jamaat-e Islam, though in close cooperation with 
the army. Given the overlapping role of the army in their operations, and no 
suggestion these raids were systematic and consistent across time and space, 
especially compared to the overwhelming responsibility of the army 
discussed in all sources, this has been coded as 0.5 for political participation. 
The role of the army in recruiting and mobilising these groups has been 
coded as 0.5. 
Sources Ahmed, Ziauddin. 1996. “The Case of Bangladesh: Bringing to Trial the 
Perpetrators of the 1971 Genocide.” In Contemporary Genocides: Causes, 
Cases, Consequences, edited by Albert J. Jongman, 95–115. Leiden: 
PIOOM.   
Bass, Gary J. 2013. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten 
Genocide. Kindle edition. Vintage.   
Jahan, Rounaq. 2009. “Genocide in Bangladesh.” In Century of Genocide: 
Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and 
William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 245–66. New York: Routledge.   
Gates, Scott, and Kaushik Roy. 2014. Unconventional Warfare in South 
Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency. Burlington, Vermont: 
Routledge.  
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 1972. The Events in East 
Pakistan, 1971: A Legal Study. Geneva.  
Rummel, R. J. 2009. Death by Government. Revised edition. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
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Country Uganda 
Time period of 
killing 
1971-1979 
Duration of 
killing 
98 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
99 
Notes 
 
Sources Amnesty International. 1978. “Human Rights in Uganda.” AFR 
59/O5/78.   
 
———. 1979. “Amnesty International Report 1979.”   
 
Kasozi, A.B.K. 1994. The Social Origins of Violence in 
Uganda, 1964-1985. Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press. 
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Country Philippines 
Time period of 
killing 
1972-1976 
Duration of 
killing 
45 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
2.3 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
2.5 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998 
Notes The McKenna article describes a pattern of violence beginning in the late 
60s in which armed gangs of Christians organised by settlers – and 
potentially also politicians – attacked Muslim civilians as well as Muslim 
armed groups, with the government taking their side (McKenna 1998, 154-
155). Lidasan similarly describes the formation of Christian militias by 
civilians (2013, 102). This would be coded as 1 for GCMs. However, this 
took place before the beginning of the geno-politicide as coded by Harff, and 
is described as “sporadic fighting by Lidasan (102), with around 1500 people 
killed by the end of 1971 (106). According to McKenna, there is then a 6 
month lull with no sectarian violence, followed by the imposition of marital 
law, which he sees as the spark for large scale violence (156). The main 
actor after this appears to have been the army. In Lidasan’s source as well, 
the Ilaga militia is no longer mentioned after the army imposes martial law. 
Ahmad does mention a government consolidation of “the most reactionary” 
Christians into the Civilian Home Defense Force (26), but this group was 
“tightly controlled” by the armed forces, and appears to have taken part in 
fighting (26). He too focuses on the government once martial law is 
imposed. For these reasons, the conclusion has been drawn that while 
violence started due to civilian participation, it became a geno-politicide due 
to the army, and the geno-politicide was carried out by the army. Civilian 
participation has therefore been coded as N.E.  
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The violence appears to have had a settler colonial dynamic (Lidasan 76-80) 
Sources Ahmad, Aijaz. 2000. “The War Against the Muslims.” In Rebels, Warlords 
and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern 
Philippines, edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch, 21–38. 
Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy.   
 
Gutierrez, Eric. 2000. “In the Battlefields of the Warlord.” In Rebels, 
Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in 
Southern Philippines, edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch, 39–
84. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy.   
 
Lidasan, Nasser Pendatun. 2013. The Complexity of Armed Conflict in 
Mindanao: Beyond Economic Deprivation, Discrimination, and Inequality. 
Old Dominion University. 
 
McKenna, Thomas M. 1998. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics 
and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. First edition. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
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Country Burundi 
Time period of 
killing 
1972-1973 
Duration of 
killing 
21 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
4 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Party-military 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974 Yes: 
Lemarchand 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008, 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008 Yes: Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & 
Martin 1974 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
1 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & 
Martin 1974 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & 
Martin 1974 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Lemarchand 2008 Yes: Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & 
Martin 1974 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & 
Martin 1974 
Notes In this instance the coding of the genocide is not in line with the sources. 
The dataset treats all instances of ethnic violence in Burundi from 1965-
1973 as one incident. This leads to a pattern of killing consisting of one 
episode in 1965 (4000-8000 dead) of Hutus killing Tutsis, followed by six 
years (1 year of 1000-2000, 3 of 300-100, and 2 of 0-300) of low level 
violence. In 1972 there is then a sudden outbreak of anti-Tutsi violence 
killing around 1000 people. The Tutsi government then retaliated by killing 
hundreds of thousands of Hutu in ’72 and ’73 (Lemarchand 2008). Sources 
focus solely on this genocide, and the killing that preceded it is seen as 
necessary context, but not as part of the genocide (2008). For this reason, 
lack of information on the previous killing, and the fact that the death toll of 
the previous killing was below 50 000 dead, only 1972 and 1973 have been 
coded.    
 
Lemarchand describes the majority of the killing as being carried out by the 
army and the youth wing of the ruling party, the JRR (2008). However, he 
also emphasises the fear that meant “the killing of Hutu seemed to have 
become part of the civic duty expected of every Tutsi citizen” (2009, 272). 
He describes ordinary men being handed out rifles, students beating their 
classmates to death, and refugees carrying out much of the killing in the 
north. In the absence of any evidence that these were organised militias 
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created by civilians in order to kill, this has been coded as 1 for ad hoc 
killing.   
 
The JRR has been coded under political participation, in the absence of 
evidence that it was a pro-government militia rather than a wing of the 
political party. 
Sources Kay, Reginald, and René Lemarchand. 1987. “Burundi since the Genocide.” 
Article; Article/Report. London : Minority Rights Group. 
https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/45053025.  
 
Lemarchand, René. 2008. “The Burundi Killings of 1972.” Sciences Po 
Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. June 2008. 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.  
 
———. 2009. “The Burundi Genocide.” In Century of Genocide: Critical 
Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. 
Parsons, 3rd ed., 267–82. New York: Routledge.  
 
Lemarchand, René, and David Martin. 1974. Selective Genocide in Burundi. 
Minority Rights Group. 
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Country Angola 
Time period of 
killing 
1975-1994 
Duration of 
killing 
228 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  1 
Regime type Party-based/rebel group 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
1 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E. HRW 1989; HRW 1999 No: Brinkman 2000 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E. HRW 1989; HRW 1999 No: Brinkman 2000 Yes: Heywood 2011 
(One instance) 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999 
Notes The politicide in Angola was carried by both the government and the rebel 
group UNITA (Harff 2003), the latter of which ruled over a varying but 
substantial territory (HRW 1989). The mutual politicide has been coded as 
one event, and given that no civilian participation was found on either side, 
this does not obscure any differences between the two sides to the conflict. 
Brinkman’s article discusses refugees’ memories of torture and mutilation 
in the Angolan War. She explicitly assigns responsibility for the killing and 
atrocities committed to soldiers (predominantly from UNITA), and the 
accounts of the war discuss interactions between soldiers and civilians 
(2000, 8). Therefore, the answer to Civ. Part. 2 and 3 have been coded as 
No, and the rest as N.E.  The only mention of civilian participation is one 
incident in Heywood article, in which she describes one night in 1992 on 
which people went door to door in certain cities attacked those they 
believed to be UNITA sympathisers, in the wake of UNITA’s leader 
rejecting the election results (322). Given the ad hoc nature of the weapons 
– “kitchen knives, pistols, clubs, machetes” (322) – and the fact that the 
violence took part over one night, this has been coded as ad hoc violence. 
Given the fact that it is one incident in one source, ad hoc violence has been 
coded as 99. No other sources refer to any violence carried out by civilians, 
and refer only to state/military agents of the government or UNITA. 
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Sources Brinkman, Inge. 2000. “Ways of Death: Accounts of Terror from Angolan 
Refugees in Namibia.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 
70 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/1161399.  
 
Heywood, Linda M. 2011. “Angola and the Violent Years 1975-2008: 
Civilian Casualties.” Portugese Studies Review 19 (1–2): 311–32.  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1989. Angola: Violations of the Laws of War 
by Both Sides. New York.  
 
———. 1999. Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace 
Process. New York. 
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Country Cambodia 
Time period of 
killing 
1975-1979 
Duration of 
killing 
45 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
4 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
5 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Party-based 
Communist 
state  
1 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  N/A 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
s1342487 
97 
 
Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004 
Notes Given the way Cambodia was run under the Khmer Rouge, it is very 
difficult to distinguish between state, party and military. In Kiernan's work 
on the regime, for example, it is impossible to determine whether party 
members acted under the authority of the party or that of the state, and 
indeed whether there was any difference. The same overlap between the 
power of the state and that of the party cadres is seen in Hinton 2004 (156-
157). While there was a division between party members and the army 
(Kiernan 2009, 263; Hinton, 87), it is unclear whether those carrying out 
killing were part of the internal security forces or armed party members - 
and again, there does not appear to have been much difference. Given the 
absence of participation by civilian members of the party who were not 
members of the government or directly working for the state (as we see in 
cases such as Burundi or Indonesia), political participation has been coded as 
no evidence.  
Sources Hinton, Alexander Laban. 2004. Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the 
Shadow of Genocide. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
Kiernan, Ben. 1996. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in 
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. First Edition edition. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.   
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———. 2009. “The Cambodia Genocide 1975-1979.” In Century of 
Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel 
Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 283–313. New York: Routledge. 
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Country Indonesia 
Time period of 
killing 
1975-1992 
Duration of 
killing 
200 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
1.6 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Party-personal-military 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
0 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985 No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
0 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Political 
participation 
0 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009 
Notes Part 8 of the 2013 CAVR report assigns responsibility in great detail for 
killings and other atrocities. They find that the overwhelming majority of the 
killing was carried out by either the Indonesian security forces or militia 
groups “almost entirely armed, funded and controlled by the Indonesian 
military” (2276). There are no mentions of civilian participation, and 
therefore the CAVR’s findings have been coded as ‘No’ rather than N.E. 
Dunn similarly makes clear that the Indonesian forces were “[directly] 
responsible for the killing in East Timor” (2009, 230). 
Sources Amnesty International. 1985. “East Timor Violations of Human Rights: 
Extrajudicial Executions, ‘Disappearances’, Torture and Political 
Imprisonment.” London.   
 
Dunn, James. 2009. “Genocide in East Timor.” In Century of Genocide: 
Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and 
William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 218–44. New York: Routledge.  
 
Durand, Frédéric. 2011. “Three Centuries of Violence and Struggle in East 
Timor (1726-2008).” Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research 
Network. October 14, 2011. https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-
massacre-resistance/en/document/three-centuries-violence-and-struggle-east-
timor-1726-2008.   
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The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR). 2013. “Chega!: The Final Report of the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR).” Jakarta: The 
Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). 
http://chegareport.net/Chega%20All%20Volumes.pdf. 
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Country Guatemala 
Time period of 
killing 
1978-1990 
Duration of 
killing 
149 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
1.2 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Military (1978-1985), indirect military (1985-1990) 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
1 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
Yes: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006 Yes: CEH 1999 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, CEH 1999, Valentino 2006 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Jonas 2009, CEH 1999, Valentino 2006 
Notes The case of the PACs, “civilian self-defense patrols”, is difficult to code 
(Jonas 2009, 319). They were comprised of civilians – up to one million of 
them – but were highly coercive. The army forced people to join and even 
kill others with threats of fines or being treated as an enemy of the state 
(319). This goes beyond societal/peer pressure, and into the realm of express 
coercion by the government, with severe consequences for disobeying. The 
CEH report indicates that 18% of “human rights violations and acts of 
violence” were committed by the civil patrols (1999, 86). However, on the 
same page the report indicates that they see the violence carried out by the 
civil patrols as falling under the responsibility of the state. Given this 
conclusion, and the strong indication given by Jonas (2009) and Valentino 
(2004) that civilians did not join this groups with the goal of participating in 
killing, and that they were a tool of the military, these groups have not been 
counted as civilian participation. However, they have been coded as an 
affirmative answer to the question of whether the government called upon 
civilians to join the killing.  
 
The CEH report discusses the role of death squads, stating that they were 
“initially criminal groups made up of private individuals who enjoyed the 
tolerance and complicity of state authorities”, but “later various actions 
committed by these groups were a consequence of decisions by the Army 
command, and that the composition of the death squads varied over time as 
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members of the military were incorporated, until they became, in some 
cases,  authentic clandestine military units” (36). The CEH report also 
discusses the role of “economically powerful people” who committed (or 
commissioned) acts of violence (44). These acts were mostly committed 
jointly with the state. The violence committed by these people presumably 
accounts for a part of the 4% of violence seen as the responsibility of 
“unidentified armed groups, civilian elements and other public officials” 
(86). Therefore this has been coded as evidence that civilians occasionally 
but inconsistently formed militias and organised groups (0.5) for question 1 
of civilian participation. 
Sources Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations 
(CEH). 1999. “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.” Commission for Historical 
Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations.  
 
 Jonas, Susanne. 2009. “Guatemala: Acts of Genocide and Scorched-Earth 
Counterinsurgency War.” In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and 
Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd 
ed., 314–43. New York: Routledge.   
 
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2005. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide 
in the 20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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Country Afghanistan 
Time period of 
killing 
1978-1992 
Duration of 
killing 
168 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.8 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
4.5 
Type of killing  1 
Regime type Party-personal 
Communist 
state  
1 
Revolutionary 
war  
1 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; 
Arreguin-Toft 2005  
Notes None of the sources consulted refer in any way to civilians participating in 
atrocities or mass killing. Civilian deaths are attributed to frustrated 
individual soldiers or units deliberately killing civilians and a disregard for 
civilian life when attacking villages. (Braithwaite 2012, 225-235), a policy 
of genocide (Kakar 1997) or a "systematic policy of killing civilians" 
(Valentino 2009, 218). 
Sources Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2005. “The USSR in Afghanistan: The Afghan Civil 
War, 1979–1989.” In How the Weak Win Wars, 169–99. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.    
Braithwaite, Rodric. 2012. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-
1989. London: Profile Books.   
Dorronsoro, Gilles. 2005. Revolution Unending : Afghanistan, 1979 to the 
Present. CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies. New 
York: Columbia University Press.   
Kakar, M. Hasan. 1997. Afghanistan : The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan 
Response, 1979-1982. 1997. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.    
Valentino, Benjamin A. 2005. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide 
in the 20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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Country El Salvador 
Time period of 
killing 
1980-1989 
Duration of 
killing 
101 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
1.4 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
2.5 
Type of killing  1 
Regime type Party-military (1980-1982) Indirect military (1982-1989) 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
1 
Ethnic war  0 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
0.5 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
Yes: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
s1342487 
113 
 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009 
Notes The Truth Commission Report is a highly extensive account of the violence. 
Section IV.A describes 85% of the violence as being carried by agents of the 
state (military, security forces, or death squads) (1993). Section IV D.2 of 
the Report describes the composition of the death squads, who carried out 
more than 10% of the killing catalogued by the Commission. ‘Civilian’ 
death squads were recruited by the security apparatus, individual members 
of the security forces, or “private and semi-official armed groups”, such as 
wealthy landowners or businessmen. These groups were linked closely to the 
official security forces. There were also ‘official’ death squads, made up of 
members of the intelligence or security forces. The Commission further 
comments that “while it is possible to differentiate the armed forces death 
squads from the civilian death squads, the borderline between the two was 
often blurred... Frequently, death squads operated in coordination with the 
armed forces and acted as a support structure for their activities. The 
clandestine nature of these activities made it possible to conceal the State's 
responsibility for them” (CTEL, 1993 126). This is supported by Stanley 
(1996, 192), who also states that “by far the greater part of the killing was 
being carried out by official agencies [as opposed to private death squads]” 
(228).  Given the involvement of civilians in these death squads – both in 
joining government efforts, and in beginning their own, this is seen as an 
affirmative answer to Civ. Part. Q1. However, as there were both civilian 
and military death squads, the lines between them were blurred, and attempts 
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were made to bring them under government control (Stanley, 1996 192) it 
has been coded as 0.5.  
 
 It is interesting to note that this is a case where the civilian perpetrators are 
wealthy people using their power to assist a political/military cause they 
support – rather than civilians on the ground taking part. 
Sources Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (CTEL). 1993. “From Madness to 
Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the 
Truth for El Salvador.” S/25500. United Nations.  
Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? : How 
Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.   
Stanley, William. 1996. The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military 
Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
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Country Uganda 
Time period of 
killing 
1980-1986 
Duration of 
killing 
73 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.2 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  3 
Regime type Personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: Kasozi 1994. N.E.: Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985, 1986, 1987 
Notes Due to the lack of sources on this geno-politicide, Amnesty International 
yearly reports were consulted for every year of the geno-politicide, and no 
evidence of civilian participation was found. Kasozi, however, highlights in 
detail the role of UPC (ruling party) members in carrying out killing, 
describing "party functionaries" as "a key element in the destruction of life 
and property." (1994, 151). Political participation has therefore been coded 
as 1. 
Sources Amnesty International. 1981. Amnesty International Report 1981. London: 
Amnesty International Publications. 
 
 ———. 1982. Amnesty International Report 1982. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.  
 
———. 1983. Amnesty International Report 1983. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.  
 
 
———. 1984. Amnesty International Report 1984. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.  
 
———. 1985. Amnesty International Report 1985. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.  
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———. 1986. Amnesty International Report 1986. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.  
 
———. 1987. Amnesty International Report 1987. London: Amnesty 
International Publications.   
 
Kasozi, A.B.K. 1994. The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985. 
Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
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Country Sudan 
Time period of 
killing 
1983-2002 
Duration of 
killing 
229 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.8 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
5 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Personal (1983-1985), Military (1985-1986), Personal (1986-2002) 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
99 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002 
Notes Similarly to the first geno-politicide to take place in Sudan, this instance also 
saw the participation of tribal militias that can sometimes be difficult to 
distinguish from civilians. However, in 1989 the government passed the 
Popular Defence Forces Act, which gave tribal (and other) militias official 
recognition, and declared them to be paramilitary groups that operated 
alongside the army (Salih 2015, 111). The fact that these militias operate 
under the command of the government is confirmed by HRW (1996) and the 
UN special rapporteur (Biro 1996). These militias have therefore not been 
coded as civilian participation. 
 
Sources Human Rights Watch. 1996. “Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in 
Sudan.” Human Rights Watch.  
 
Salih, M.A. Mohamed. 2015. “Regimes of Truth: On Genocide in the Nuba 
Mountains.” In Sudan’s Killing Fields: Political Violence and 
Fragmentation, edited by Laura Nyantung Beny and Sondra Hale, 99–116. 
Trenton: The Red Sea Press.   
 
United Nations. 1994. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of 
the Special Rapporteur, Gáspár Bíró, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/60.” E/CN.4/1994/48.  
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———. 1995. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Gáspár Bíró.” E/CN.4/1995/58.  
 
———. 1996. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Gáspár Bíró, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/77.” E/CN.4/1996/62.  
 
———. 1997. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Gáspár Bíró, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/73.” E/CN.4/1997/58.  
 
———. 2002. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Gerhart Baum, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission Resolution 2001/18.” E/CN.4/2002/46. 
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Country Iraq 
Time period of 
killing 
1988-1991 
Duration of 
killing 
40 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.9 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
4 
Type of killing  2 
Regime type Personal 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
0 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
0 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
0 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Political 
participation 
0 
Political 
participation 
sources 
No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994. 
Notes All sources cited are extremely clear in stating that the killing was centrally 
organised and carried out by the military. A great deal of secrecy and 
bureaucratic language was employed (Leezenberg 2009, 398; HRW 1994) to 
provide deniability, making it clear that civilians were not called upon to 
join the killing. The only forces besides the secret police and the military 
were Kurdish irregular troops, but it is clear that these troops were under the 
direct command and control of the Iraqi army, had other functions beyond 
killing, were secretive about the fact that they were involved in killing, and 
in fact did not often do so directly, and most importantly, no mention is 
made of recruitment rising once the killing began. Therefore, all sources 
have been coded as ‘No’. 
Sources Hiltermann, Joost. 2008. “The 1998 Al-Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan.” 
Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. February 3, 
2008. https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/1988-anfal-campaign-iraqi-kurdistan.  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1993. “Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal 
Campaign Against the Kurds.” New York.  
 
———. 1994. “Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its 
Own Words.” New York.  
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Leezenberg, Michiel. 2009. “The Anfal Operations in Iraqi Kurdistan.” In 
Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by 
Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 385–403. New York: 
Routledge. 
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Country Bosnia 
Time period of 
killing 
1992-1995 
Duration of 
killing 
42 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.4 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
4 
Type of killing  0 
Regime type Party-personal (Serbia) 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: United Nations 1994. Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: United Nations 1994. Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
Yes: United Nations 1994; Helsinki Watch 1992; Power 2002. N.E. 
Oberschall 2014; Hoare 2000  
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
0.5 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
99 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
Yes: United Nations 1994. N.E.: Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: United Nations 1994;  Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
N.E.: United Nations 1994;  Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
Political 
participation 
99 
Political 
participation 
sources 
N.E.: United Nations 1994; Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 
1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000 
Notes Power describes a pattern of killing by the perpetrators, in which artillery 
would strike villages, paramilitaries would enter the village to kill or expel 
the inhabitants, and finally a number of the paramilitaries and regular troops 
would carry out looting (2002, 266). 
 
All sources note the participation of Serbian paramilitary groups in the 
conflict and in atrocities. These groups have not been classified as civilian 
participation, due to the fact that they were involved in fighting against 
Croatian and Bosnian forces, and can therefore be considered combatants 
rather than civilians (Helsinki Watch 1992, 36-38). They were also armed 
and extensively trained by the (Bosnian) Serbian government (Oberschall 
2000, 986). Oberschall describes this process of government training as 
follows: "[the militiaman] became encapsulated in a quasi-military unit 
subject to peer solidarity and ethnic loyalty. He was trained in weapons and 
indoctrinated with the beliefs and norms of the crisis frame about other 
ethnics" (997). 
 
However, a UN investigation into the ethnic cleansing carried out in the first 
phase of the war discusses numerous times the role of armed civilians 
working alongside the paramilitaries and guarding camps, making a 
distinction between these (local) civilians and the militias (United Nations 
1994, 29, 31-32, 51). Given the reliability of this source, and the possibility 
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that the description in other sources of paramilitaries may potentially cover 
such groups as well, participation of GCMs has been coded as 0.5. It has not 
been coded as 1 due to the emphasis in other (academic) sources on the 
overwhelming role of the trained paramilitaries.   
 
Numerous sources mention the outside view of the war as being caused by 
'primordial hatred' in which neighbours attacked each other (Power 308, 327; 
Hoare 2014, 519) - which would seem to suggest civilian participation. 
However, this is not borne out by this evidence and the sources. Indeed, 
Oberschall explicitly states that this view is wrong, and that the perpetrators 
were uniformed and unfamiliar to the victims (2000; 982-983). This does not 
mean that there was no civilian support for the policy of ethnic cleansing 
(Oberschall 2000) - but the image of neighbour killing neighbour is 
incorrect. 
 
However, it is also important to note Oberschall's calculation that 10-20% of 
the Bosnian Serb male population between 15-35 were militiamen (998). 
While their participation cannot be coded as civilian, it may be worth further 
investigating this.  
 
There is evidence in a number of sources that civilians profited from looting 
non-Serbian properties, or by taking them over. This has been coded as a 
positive answer for the potential for civilians to gain by participating.  
Sources Helsinki Watch. 1992. “War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina.” Human Rights 
Watch.   
 
Hoare, Marko Attila. 2014. “Towards an Explanation for the Bosnian 
Genocide of 1992–1995.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 14 (3): 516–
32. https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12111.   
 
Power, Samantha. 2002. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide. 1 edition. New York: Basic Books.   
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Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic 
Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
23 (November): 982–1001. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198700750018388.   
 
Sudetic, Chuck. 2010. “The Srebrenica Massacre (July 11-16, 1995).” 
Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. July 2010. 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-
resistance/en/document/srebrenica-massacre-july-11-16-1995.   
 
United Nations. 1994. “Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992).” 
S/1994/674. United Nations. 
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Country Burundi 
Time period of 
killing 
1993 
Duration of 
killing 
3 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
3.5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
3.5 
Type of killing  0 
Regime type N/A 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  0 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
99 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
Yes: Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; ICIB 2002; UN 1995 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
99 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
1 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
Yes: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: ICIB 2002; Bundervoet 2009 N.E. Lynch 2013; UN 1995 
Notes The ICIB and Bundervoet sources make clear that FRODEBU functionaries were 
involved in orchestrating and coordinating the killing (Bundervoet 2009, 371-374; 
ICIB 2002, 278, 283, 297, 303). Lynch does not mention this, and the 1995 UN 
report's authors were unsure as to the extent to which FRODEBU was involved. 
Sources Bundervoet, Tom. 2009. “Livestock, Land and Political Power: The 1993 Killings in 
Burundi.” Journal of Peace Research 46 (3): 357–76.   
International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi (ICIB). 2002. “International 
Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report.” S/1996/682. United Nations.   
Lynch, Meghan. 2013. “Civilian-on-Civilian Violence:  An Ethnography of Choices 
during Civil War.” Ph.D., United States -- Connecticut: Yale University. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1495967341/abstract/7F56D96AD8944088PQ/1.   
United Nations. 1995. “Report of the Preparatory Fact-Finding Mission to Burundi.” 
S/1995/157. http://undocs.org/S/1995/157. 
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Country Rwanda 
Time period of 
killing 
1994 
Duration of 
killing 
4 
Average 
severity of 
geno-politicide  
5 
Peak severity 
of geno-
politicide  
5 
Type of killing  0 
Regime type Party-military 
Communist 
state  
0 
Revolutionary 
war  
0 
Ethnic war  1 
PGMs  1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
1 
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Civilian 
mobilisation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Government 
call sources 
Yes: Desforges 158, 176; Straus 2006; Smeulers & Hoex 210. N.E. Fujii 
2008 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Societal/peer 
pressure 
sources 
Yes: Desforges 182-183, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006, Smeulers & Hoex 2010 
Civilian 
mobilisation - 
Material 
incentives 
sources 
Yes: Desforges 187-188, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006, Smeulers & Hoex 2010 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc killing 
1 
Civilian 
participation 
score 
1 
Civilian 
participation - 
GCMs sources 
Yes: Desforges 179, Fujii 2008, Smeulers & Hoex 210. N.E. Straus 2006. 
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Civilian 
participation - 
CSOs sources 
Yes: Desforges 197, Straus 2006, Fujii 2008. Unclear: Smeulers & Hoex 210 
Civilian 
participation - 
Ad hoc sources 
Yes: Desforges 197, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006. Unclear: Smeulers & Hoex 210 
Political 
participation 
1 
Political 
participation 
sources 
Yes: Desforges 197, Straus 71-72, 82, 108 N.E. Smeulers & Hoex 2010; 
Fujii 2008 
Notes There was undoubtedly a significant degree of coercion and fear involved in 
civilian participation in the killing (see Straus 2006, Fujii 2008), which 
would not be counted as voluntary participation. However, all sources 
provided convincing evidence that enough people participated out of their 
own free will, or when simply standing aside would have been enough. 
Straus describes a pattern of momentum, as men said “since we have killed, 
so must you” (89), but this relied on enough civilians joining in the first 
place.   
 
The research by Smeulers & Hoex focuses on the micro-dynamics of the 
genocide, and they describe a particular pattern in which members of the 
Interahamwe militia took the lead in forming groups and killing within them 
(2010, 442). This is describing as being a top-down process (446). However, 
given the sudden influx of civilians into Interahamwe organised groups, this 
has been coded as a positive answer to C.I. question 1. It has been coded as 
‘unclear’ for the other two questions, as the authors do not mention other 
ways of group formation that are described by other authors.    
 
As mentioned in the thesis itself, the Interahamwe have been coded as a 
PGM based on sources (Desforges 1999, 46, Smeulers & Hoex 441), as well 
as the fact that they are coded as such in the PGM database. For the political 
participation question, other members of the MRND party were focused on 
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Sources Desforges, Allison. 1999. “Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in 
Rwanda.” Human Rights Watch. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/03/01/leave-none-tell-story/genocide-
rwanda.   
 
Fujii, Lee Ann. 2008. “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the 
Rwandan Genocide.” Security Studies 17 (3): 568–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802319578.   
 
Smeulers, Alette, and Lotte Hoex. 2010. “Studying the Microdynamics of 
the Rwandan Genocide.” The British Journal of Criminology 50 (3): 435–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azq004.   
 
Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in 
Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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